SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES DONALD J. TRUMP, PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES, ET AL., Applicants,) No. 24A884 v. CASA, INC., ET AL., Respondents. DONALD J. TRUMP, PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES, ET AL., Applicants, WASHINGTON, ET AL.,) No. 24A885 Respondents. DONALD J. TRUMP, PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES, ET AL., Applicants, v.) No. 24A886 NEW JERSEY, ET AL., Respondents. Pages: 1 through 162 Place: Washington, D.C. Date: May 15, 2025

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1	IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE	E UNITED STATE	S
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3	DONALD J. TRUMP, PRESIDENT OF THE)	
4	UNITED STATES, ET AL.,)	
5	Applicants,)	
6	v.) No. 24A884	
7	CASA, INC., ET AL.,)	
8	Respondents.)	
9		-	
10	DONALD J. TRUMP, PRESIDENT OF THE)	
11	UNITED STATES, ET AL.,)	
12	Applicants,)	
13	V.) No. 24A885	5
14	WASHINGTON, ET AL.,)	
15	Respondents.)	
16		_	
17	DONALD J. TRUMP, PRESIDENT OF THE)	
18	UNITED STATES, ET AL.,)	
19	Applicants,)	
20	V.) No. 24A886	5
21	NEW JERSEY, ET AL.,)	
22	Respondents.)	
23		_	
24	Washington, D.C.		
25	Thursday, May 15, 2	2025	

1	
2	The above-entitled matter came on for oral
3	argument before the Supreme Court of the United States
4	at 10:12 a.m.
5	
6	APPEARANCES:
7	GEN. D. JOHN SAUER, Solicitor General, Department of
8	Justice, Washington, D.C.; on behalf of the
9	Applicants.
10	JEREMY M. FEIGENBAUM, Solicitor General, Trenton, New
11	Jersey; on behalf of the State and City
12	Respondents.
13	KELSI B. CORKRAN, ESQUIRE, Washington, D.C.; on behalf
14	of the Private Respondents.
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1	PROCEEDINGS
2	(10:12 a.m.)
3	CHIEF JUSTICE ROBERTS: We will hear
4	argument this morning in Case 24A884, Trump
5	versus CASA, Incorporated, and the consolidated
6	cases.
7	General Sauer.
8	ORAL ARGUMENT OF GEN. D. JOHN SAUER
9	ON BEHALF OF THE APPLICANTS
10	GENERAL SAUER: Mr. Chief Justice, and
11	may it please the Court:
12	On January 20, 2025, President Trump
13	issued Executive Order 14,160, Protecting the
14	Meaning and Value of American Citizenship. This
15	order reflects the original meaning of the
16	Fourteenth Amendment, which guaranteed
17	citizenship to the children of former slaves,
18	not to illegal aliens or temporary visitors.
19	Multiple district courts promptly
20	issued nationwide or universal injunctions
21	blocking this order, and a cascade of such
22	universal injunctions followed. Since
23	January 20, district courts have now issued 40
24	universal injunctions against the federal
25	government, including 35 from the same five

- 1 judicial districts. This is a bipartisan
- 2 problem that has now spanned the last five
- 3 presidential administrations.
- 4 Universal injunctions exceed the
- 5 judicial power granted in Article III, which
- 6 exists only to address the injury to the
- 7 complaining party. They transgress the
- 8 traditional bounds of equitable authority, and
- 9 they create a host of practical problems.
- 10 Such injunctions prevent the
- 11 percolation of novel and difficult legal
- 12 questions. They encourage rampant forum
- 13 shopping. They require judges to make rushed,
- 14 high-stakes, low-information decisions. They
- 15 circumvent Rule 23 by offering all the benefits
- 16 but none of the burdens of class certification.
- 17 They operate asymmetrically, forcing the
- 18 government to win everywhere while the
- 19 plaintiffs can win anywhere. They invert --
- 20 invert the ordinary hierarchy of appellate
- 21 review. They create the ongoing risk of
- 22 conflicting judgments. They increase the
- 23 pressures on this Court's emergency docket.
- 24 They create what Justice Powell described as
- 25 repeated and essentially head-on confrontations

- 1 between the life-tenured and representative
- 2 branches of government. And they disrupt the
- 3 Constitution's careful balancing of the
- 4 separation of powers.
- I welcome the Court's questions.
- 6 JUSTICE THOMAS: General Sauer, the --
- 7 these universal injunctions, as you say, have
- 8 proliferated over the last three decades or so.
- 9 Would you discuss, though, the origins of
- 10 universal injunctions? In particular, I'm
- interested in sort of historical analogues or
- the historical pedigree, particularly the bill
- of peace that was proffered by Respondents.
- 14 GENERAL SAUER: Yes, Justice Thomas.
- 15 As you, I think, first pointed out in your
- separate opinion in Trump against Hawaii, the
- 17 bill of peace is something very distinct from a
- 18 universal injunction. So the bill of peace
- involved a -- a resolution of a small, discrete
- 20 set of claims of a small discrete group. And,
- 21 even more fundamentally, it was binding on the
- 22 members of that class and those represented by
- 23 the class. So it's much more analogous to a
- 24 modern class action under Rule 23.
- 25 And, in fact, as we've argued in other

1 cases and as this Court has described in 2 opinions like Ortiz, the bill of peace evolved into and has directly developed into, so to 3 speak, the modern class action that has all 4 the -- the same features of a bill of peace. 5 So, in the words of Chief Judge Sutton 6 7 in the Sixth Circuit, the bill of peace was a domesticated animal that looks nothing like the 8 9 dragon of a universal junction. 10 JUSTICE SOTOMAYOR: I'm sorry. 11 CHIEF JUSTICE ROBERTS: You --12 JUSTICE SOTOMAYOR: Here --13 CHIEF JUSTICE ROBERTS: Go ahead. 14 JUSTICE SOTOMAYOR: Here, there's a 15 discrete identified group on one issue: Does 16 citizenship mean are you born in the territory 17 of the United States, or does it mean are you loyal to someone else, which is your claim, or 18 19 are your parents loyal to someone else? So that's no different than what 20 21 happened in a peace -- in a bill of peace. 2.2 United States is bigger, so it extends more 23 broadly, but it's still an identifiable group on 24 a discrete, singular question. 25 GENERAL SAUER: Your Honor, I'd say

- 1 three things in response to that.
- 2 First of all, our primary contention
- 3 is that the Citizenship Clause related to the
- 4 children of former slaves, not to illegal aliens
- 5 who weren't even present as a discrete class at
- 6 that time.
- But, more fundamentally here, as to
- 8 the issue of the bill of peace, there are
- 9 critical differences. The bill of peace was a
- 10 binding judgment that would bind absent class
- 11 members. Here, we have the (a)(C)(3) --
- 12 JUSTICE SOTOMAYOR: Well, here, class
- actions don't bind anyone who opts out, so class
- 14 actions are not like bills of peace.
- 15 GENERAL SAUER: I would think that a
- Rule 23(b)(2) class action, which would be the
- 17 relevant analogue here, would be one that would
- 18 be binding on absent class members and would not
- 19 have the same notice and opt-out procedures.
- 20 And, more fundamentally, that sort of
- argument that there's a commonality here among,
- 22 you know, all the people who purport to be
- affected by this is the sort of argument that's
- 24 made in class certification motions that were
- 25 never presented.

1	JUSTICE SOTOMAYOR: So can I ask you a
2	question? Your theory here is argue arguing
3	that Article III and principles of equity both
4	prohibit federal courts from issuing universal
5	injunctions. Do I have your argument correct?
6	GENERAL SAUER: We argue both of those
7	and there are independent reasons.
8	JUSTICE SOTOMAYOR: You argue both of
9	those?
10	GENERAL SAUER: Yeah.
11	JUSTICE SOTOMAYOR: If that's true,
12	that means even the Supreme Court doesn't have
13	that power.
14	GENERAL SAUER: The Supreme Court
15	would have the authority to issue binding
16	precedent nationwide, but as this Court
17	JUSTICE SOTOMAYOR: But we couldn't
18	enforce it against universally, is your
19	argument?
20	GENERAL SAUER: If there was a a
21	a decision that violated the precedent of the
22	Court, then the affected plaintiffs could get a
23	separate judgment.
24	JUSTICE SOTOMAYOR: And that means
25	GENERAL SAUER: So and that is what

1 this Court --2 JUSTICE SOTOMAYOR: -- you're --3 you're talking about the hundreds and thousands of people who weren't part of the judgment of 4 5 the court. They would all have to file individual actions? 6 7 GENERAL SAUER: Not necessarily. There are other --8 9 JUSTICE SOTOMAYOR: Or -- or a class action. 10 11 GENERAL SAUER: A class action would 12 be --13 JUSTICE SOTOMAYOR: Isn't that -- that 14 makes no sense whatsoever. 15 GENERAL SAUER: Respectfully, we 16 believe that --17 JUSTICE SOTOMAYOR: Well, what was the 18 purpose of the bill of peace if not to settle a 19 legal question finally? 20 GENERAL SAUER: In --21 JUSTICE SOTOMAYOR: And if even the 22 Supreme Court doesn't have that right and must 23 invite hundreds of thousands of lawsuits, what 24 are we buying into?

GENERAL SAUER: If a set of claims

- 1 satisfies the rigorous criteria of Rule 23, Rule
- 2 23 is the modern analogue of a bill of peace.
- 3 We have something very different here.
- 4 JUSTICE SOTOMAYOR: So what -- what --
- 5 CHIEF JUSTICE ROBERTS: Did it --
- JUSTICE SOTOMAYOR: No, we don't,
- 7 because the argument here is that the president
- 8 is violating an established -- not just one but,
- 9 by my count, four established Supreme Court
- 10 precedents.
- 11 We have the Wong Ark case, where we
- 12 said fealty to a foreign sovereign doesn't
- 13 defeat your entitlement -- your parents' fealty
- 14 to a foreign sovereign doesn't defeat your
- entitlement to citizenship as a child. We have
- 16 another case where we said that even if your
- 17 parents are here illegally, if you're born here,
- 18 you're a citizen. We have yet another case that
- 19 says, even if your parents came here and were
- 20 stopped at the border and -- but you were born
- in our territory, you're still a citizen. And
- 22 we have another case that says, even if your
- 23 parents secured citizenship illegally, you're
- 24 still a citizen.
- So, as far as I see it, this order

- 1 violates four Supreme Court precedents.
- 2 GENERAL SAUER: Yeah. We --
- JUSTICE SOTOMAYOR: And you are -- and
- 4 you are claiming that not just the Supreme
- 5 Court -- that both the Supreme Court and no
- 6 lower court can stop an executive from --
- 7 universally -- from violating that holding --
- 8 those holdings by this Court.
- 9 GENERAL SAUER: We are not claiming
- 10 that because we're conceding that there could be
- 11 a -- in an appropriate case, a Rule 23 class
- 12 action.
- JUSTICE SOTOMAYOR: Only a class --
- only by a class action.
- 15 CHIEF JUSTICE ROBERTS: Can I hear
- 16 the -- can I hear the rest of his answer?
- 17 GENERAL SAUER: A Rule 23 class
- 18 action. And then the more fundamental point as
- 19 to all those Supreme Court decisions you
- 20 referred to --
- JUSTICE SOTOMAYOR: So what do we do
- 22 temporarily?
- 23 GENERAL SAUER: Temporarily, the
- 24 court may issue -- the lower courts may issue
- 25 injunctions that remediate the injuries to the

- 1 plaintiffs that appear before them. Lower
- 2 courts in appropriate cases may certify class
- 3 actions --
- 4 JUSTICE SOTOMAYOR: So, when a new
- 5 president --
- 6 CHIEF JUSTICE ROBERTS: Could I,
- 7 counsel?
- JUSTICE SOTOMAYOR: -- so, when a new
- 9 president orders that because there's so much
- 10 gun violence going on in the country and he
- 11 comes in and he says, I have the right to take
- away the guns from everyone, then people -- and
- 13 he sends out the military to seize everyone's
- 14 guns -- we and the courts have to sit back and
- 15 wait until every named plaintiff gets -- or
- 16 every plaintiff whose gun is taken comes into
- 17 court?
- 18 GENERAL SAUER: In appropriate cases,
- 19 courts have certified class actions on an
- 20 emergency basis. We found at least four cases
- in recent years where that was done.
- But, more fundamentally, we profoundly
- 23 disagree with the characterization of the
- 24 merits. This is now fully briefed in the Ninth
- 25 Circuit in Case Number 25-807, where we describe

- 1 how that characterization of the holding of Wong
- 2 Kim Ark and the other decisions is profoundly
- 3 incorrect. And that is --
- 4 JUSTICE SOTOMAYOR: You still
- 5 haven't --
- 6 CHIEF JUSTICE ROBERTS: Counsel, could
- 7 I ask you about a different type of -- of case
- 8 that has broader impact than on the particular
- 9 claimant, like a claimant who's alleging that
- 10 the districting in a particular case has
- 11 resulted in racial discrimination against him or
- 12 her based on how the district is drawn.
- Now a judicial decision about that one
- 14 plaintiff would implicate the redistricting
- 15 throughout the whole case, so -- so --
- 16 throughout the whole state.
- 17 How -- how does your theory address
- 18 that situation?
- 19 GENERAL SAUER: That would be what you
- 20 might call an indivisible remedy, where what the
- 21 Court is doing there by, for example, redrawing
- 22 the district lines is, as this Court said in
- 23 Gill against Whitford, the only way to remediate
- 24 the injury of voting in an unconstitutionally
- drawn district, that is similar to abatement of

- 1 a public nuisance or, for example, in the school
- 2 desegregation cases, where remediating the
- 3 injury to the plaintiff before the court
- 4 necessarily has collateral consequences to many
- 5 others.
- 6 Certain environmental cases might have
- 7 a similar thing. For example, you stop the
- 8 local plant from pouring, you know, water
- 9 pollution into the water. That benefits the
- 10 plaintiff. It happens to benefit a bunch of
- 11 other people.
- Now that's very different than what we
- have in these universal injunctions where it is
- 14 a divisible remedy. I mean, I point to the
- 15 holding of the District of Massachusetts in this
- 16 case looking at the individual plaintiffs. That
- 17 court said: Well, obviously, I don't have to
- 18 give a universal injunction to -- to protect
- 19 individuals other than the individual
- 20 plaintiffs. They are given complete relief by
- 21 an injunction that tells federal officials only
- 22 to treat their children as citizens.
- JUSTICE JACKSON: But why -- I guess
- 24 the question is: Why -- why does the law
- 25 require that? I mean, I appreciate that a court

- 1 could in a divisible remedy kind of case narrow
- 2 in to the plaintiff. But you seem to be
- 3 suggesting that Article III or Rule 23 or
- 4 something requires that, and I -- I guess I
- 5 don't really understand it.
- 6 GENERAL SAUER: Yeah. If I may offer
- 7 two responses to that.
- 8 JUSTICE JACKSON: Yes. Yes.
- 9 GENERAL SAUER: In the Article III
- 10 context, that is the principle announced in
- 11 Warth against Seldin, announced in Gill against
- 12 Whitford, in Lewis against Casey, where this
- 13 Court has said again and again: What we do in
- 14 the Article III context is grant remedy that is
- 15 tailored to -- grant remedies that are tailored
- 16 to remove the injury to the complaining
- 17 plaintiff.
- 18 Sometimes they have very broad
- 19 collateral consequences. But, in the Article
- 20 III context, what the Court has not done and
- 21 every time it's focused on this in national
- 22 treasuries union, employees unions, in the --
- 23 the Perkins against Lukens --
- JUSTICE JACKSON: But I guess I -- I
- don't see why then the divisible remedies or

- 1 indivisible remedies is an argument. I mean, if
- 2 Article III is suggesting that the Court has to
- 3 focus in on the plaintiff only, then it would
- 4 seem to me that that would be the power
- 5 requirement across the board.
- I thought Article III was really about
- 7 limiting the Court's power with respect to
- 8 jurisdiction, that we say the Court has to
- 9 determine whether or not there's subject matter
- jurisdiction over the issue and whether or not
- 11 there's personal jurisdiction over the
- defendant, and once you have those things, the
- 13 Court can evaluate the merits of the legal issue
- and issue, especially in equity, appropriate
- 15 relief.
- Now I appreciate that there are some
- 17 prudential concerns that the Court considers,
- 18 but it seems to me that in many, many, many
- 19 circumstances we have not required the Court to
- 20 limit their relief to the particular plaintiff
- 21 as a matter of constitutional Article III
- 22 requirement.
- 23 GENERAL SAUER: I disagree with that.
- 24 And I offer a response both, first, as to
- 25 Article III and then as to the -- the scope of

- 1 equitable authority.
- In the Article III context, this Court
- 3 said in Warth against Seldin, for example, that
- 4 the Article III judicial power exists only to
- 5 redress the injury to the complaining parties.
- 6 Again, in Gill against Whitford and
- 7 Lewis against Casey --
- 8 JUSTICE JACKSON: All right. So let
- 9 me give you a hypothetical. So suppose we have
- 10 a manufacturing plant that unlawfully releases
- 11 environmental toxins into the air, and we have a
- 12 plaintiff who live -- lives near the plant,
- brings a nuisance lawsuit and says they're being
- 14 harmed by unlawful release.
- Your argument suggests that the
- judgment for the plaintiff has to narrow in on
- 17 preventing -- to the extent possible, preventing
- 18 harm to the plaintiff. But it seems to me that
- 19 that's not necessarily the case.
- 20 You -- you suggest with the Chief
- Justice in response to him that there can be
- 22 incidental beneficiaries, that the Court could
- 23 say no more toxins if it's unlawful for the --
- the defendant to do that, correct?
- 25 GENERAL SAUER: Yes, we -- that -

```
1
                JUSTICE JACKSON: So why -- why if
 2
      your Article III principle is correct?
 3
                GENERAL SAUER: Because, again, the
      Article III principle is remedying the injury to
 4
      the plaintiff or set of plaintiffs -- it could
 5
     be many -- who are before the court --
 6
 7
                JUSTICE JACKSON: Right.
                GENERAL SAUER: -- and that has
 8
 9
      collateral consequences that could help.
10
                JUSTICE BARRETT: Counsel, let me --
11
      let me ask you on that point: Would one
12
     distinction be who is bound by the judgment?
               Like, I'm wondering whether if the
13
14
     plaintiff needs -- you can only -- I think Judge
15
      Strauss said in the Eighth Circuit when
16
     addressing this issue you can't peel off part of
17
      a nuisance, so the whole thing has to be shut
18
      down.
19
                Could a neighbor sue affirmatively to
     hold the nuisance-maker in contempt if he
20
      started to re-begin, you know, begin again the
21
2.2
     nuisance?
23
                GENERAL SAUER: That's a great point.
24
      It would not be binding on those collaterally
25
     benefitted parties, so to speak. I don't want
```

- 1 to call them parties because they're not parties
- 2 before the court. And that, of course,
- 3 highlights one of the deep problems with the
- 4 universal --
- JUSTICE JACKSON: No, but why isn't
- 6 that the answer, though?
- 7 JUSTICE BARRETT: Could you do that --
- JUSTICE JACKSON: I mean, yeah.
- 9 JUSTICE BARRETT: Could you -- well,
- 10 could you do that now for the universal
- 11 injunction? Could another -- could a -- could a
- 12 plaintiff, for example, who has the protection
- of the universal injunction but was not named in
- 14 the suit bring a contempt action of the sort I
- 15 just described?
- 16 GENERAL SAUER: They could not do
- 17 that, but what they could do is run to any of 93
- 18 other judicial districts and bring their own
- 19 lawsuit if they -- if they --
- JUSTICE BARRETT: No, no, no, no.
- 21 Under the -- under the injunction as it
- 22 stands -- under the injunctions as they stand,
- could a non-named plaintiff who has the benefit
- of the universal injunction that's currently in
- 25 place, could that plaintiff bring a contempt

1	proceeding?
2	GENERAL SAUER: We would
3	JUSTICE BARRETT: Or I guess I
4	shouldn't call them a plaintiff. Could that
5	could that non-party?
6	GENERAL SAUER: Yeah, we would we
7	would dispute that they would have the standing
8	to do that because it goes to the heart of the
9	problem.
10	JUSTICE BARRETT: Well, no, no, no,
11	I I let's see. Maybe I'm not being clear.
12	Assume the universal injunction is
13	is good. Like, drop your argument right now.
14	GENERAL SAUER: Oh, I see.
15	JUSTICE BARRETT: As they currently
16	stand, could someone who is not named in this
17	suit but a beneficiary bring a contempt
18	proceeding?
19	GENERAL SAUER: I think that that is
20	what the Respondents
21	JUSTICE BARRETT: You think they
22	could?
23	GENERAL SAUER: would certainly
24	contend.
25	JUSTICE BARRETT: Do you concede that

2.2

- 1 the plaintiffs could bring a Rule 23, like the
- 2 individual plaintiffs?
- 3 GENERAL SAUER: We -- we would
- 4 dispute -- I mean, we'd have to address the Rule
- 5 23 issues, kind of all the criteria as they come
- 6 up.
- 7 JUSTICE BARRETT: Okay. But you
- 8 could -- they could seek it. Okay. And then
- 9 last question.
- 10 GENERAL SAUER: And have done that in
- 11 Western District of Washington. It's just never
- been briefed because the -- they laughed at it.
- JUSTICE BARRETT: Okay. Just last
- 14 question on this point. The states have a
- 15 different kind of claim for financial harm, and
- they've pointed out that it would be very
- 17 difficult to remedy that without some sort of
- 18 broader relief.
- I know you contest their standing. I
- 20 want you to assume that I think they have
- 21 standing. Why wouldn't they be entitled to an
- junction of the scope of the one that has
- 23 currently been entered?
- 24 GENERAL SAUER: I would say two
- 25 reasons.

1	First of all, it's not necessary to
2	provide complete relief to the plaintiffs. What
3	we offered, for example, in the District of
4	Massachusetts in the Second or the First Circuit
5	was an injunction that would enjoin the federal
6	officials and order them to treat the people who
7	would otherwise be covered by the Executive
8	Order as eligible for the services that result
9	in the pocketbook injuries to the states.
10	And there's really no response to
11	that. That is obviously would fully
12	remediate their injuries and does not require
13	the injunction to be applied in all other 50
14	states. One state comes in and says, well,
15	people are going to move across state lines;
16	therefore, we've got 21 states in this case who
17	don't want this relief. Sorry, you've got to
18	impose it on everybody because it has to be
19	it has to be offered to this one particular
20	state. So that's that's one response.
21	The other response is this notion that
22	the states have to be provided complete relief
23	because of interstate travel and patchwork. I
24	think that's very effectively responded to by
25	Chief Judge Sutton's opinion in the Second

- 1 Circuit, where he says this is a problem. If we
- 2 adopt this logic, it justifies a universal
- 3 injunction in every single case, and that can't
- 4 be the case. The Fifth Circuit's recent docket
- 5 decision comes to the same conclusion.
- 6 JUSTICE GORSUCH: Well, what do you
- 7 say, though, to the suggestion, General, that in
- 8 this particular case, those patchwork problems
- 9 for, frankly, the government, as well as for
- 10 plaintiffs, justify broader relief?
- 11 GENERAL SAUER: As to the government,
- 12 again, Chief Judge Sutton addressed that
- directly as well when he said that's the federal
- 14 government's problem. In other words, the
- 15 federal government -- for example, in the First
- 16 Circuit, we offered that as a narrower scope of
- injunction, and the decision was: Well, that
- 18 would cause you too many administrative
- 19 problems. And I think Chief Judge Sutton
- 20 directly addresses that when he says that's a
- 21 problem for the Executive Branch in the first
- 22 instance.
- JUSTICE GORSUCH: That's your problem.
- 24 All right.
- 25 GENERAL SAUER: Yeah.

Т	JUSTICE GORSUCH: And then, with
2	respect to class certification, your your
3	friends on the other side point out that that
4	takes time, and there are, as you've emphasized,
5	hurdles that have to be met to achieve class
6	certification.
7	And the argument, of course, is that
8	the injury is immediate and ongoing and, as
9	Justice Sotomayor suggested, might be seriously
10	questioned as to its compliance with this
11	Court's precedents. Your thoughts?
12	GENERAL SAUER: I would offer a couple
13	things in response to that.
14	First of all, there are tools to
15	for the courts have tools to achieve sort of
16	class-wide universal relief. I referred earlier
17	that we found four recent district court
18	decisions where class-wide relief was given on
19	kind of an emergency basis.
20	However, more fundamentally than
21	that
22	JUSTICE GORSUCH: And you agree that
23	that's appropriate in in certain cases?
24	GENERAL SAUER: It may be
25	appropriate we do not concede that it's

- 1 appropriate in this case, but it may be
- 2 appropriate in other cases. Certainly, it's an
- 3 equitable tool that is consistent with, for
- 4 example, the grant of equitable authority in the
- 5 1789 Judiciary Act, as this Court interpreted in
- 6 the Grupo Mexicano decision and -- and,
- 7 honestly, a line of decisions going all the way
- 8 back to the early 19th century. So there are
- 9 tools to address emergency situations.
- 10 But, more fundamentally than that, it
- is a feature, not a bug, of Article III that
- 12 courts grant relief to the people who sue in
- 13 front of them. So the notion that relief has to
- 14 be given to the whole world because others who
- 15 have not taken the time to sue are not before
- 16 the courts --
- 17 JUSTICE GORSUCH: Last -- last --
- 18 GENERAL SAUER: -- is something that
- 19 results in all of these problems.
- 20 JUSTICE GORSUCH: -- last question.
- 21 Do we need to reach the Article III question? I
- 22 mean, shouldn't we -- wouldn't it be wise, even
- 23 if you were to prevail, for the Court to reserve
- that question rather than decide that Congress,
- for example, could never endow this Court with

1 that authority? 2 GENERAL SAUER: All the -- that's 3 exactly correct. The Court does not have to rest on Article III because the Court could say, 4 and as we've argued and as Justice Thomas's 5 6 separate opinion in Trump against Hawaii says, 7 the 1789 Judiciary Act, when it said suits in equity are what the federal courts can do, had 8 nothing like this in mind. 9 10 And then I'd point to the language in 11 Grupo Mexicano, where the Court said -- there, 12 what was at issue was a preliminary injunction that froze a likely insolvent debtor's assets so 13 14 that the plaintiff could collect at the end of 15 the case, and the Court said that's a nuclear 16 weapon in the law and we're not -- that -- that 17 had no analogue in 1789 in the practices of the 18 Court of Chancery. 19 And if that's a nuclear weapon, I 20 don't know what this is, where, repeatedly, 40 21 times in this administration, we're being 2.2 enjoined against --23 JUSTICE KAGAN: General --24

25

world.

GENERAL SAUER: -- against the entire

1	JUSTICE KAGAN: I'm just going to
2	ask you to put yourself in a different frame of
3	mind, hard to do, assume something you won't
4	want to assume. But the assumption that I want
5	you to make is that, on the merits, which, of
6	course, you did not take to this Court, on the
7	merits you are wrong, that the EO is unlawful.
8	And I want to ask you, if we assume
9	that, how do we get to that result on your view
10	of the rules?
11	GENERAL SAUER: It is very difficult
12	for me to attempt the hypothetical
13	JUSTICE KAGAN: Yeah. Well
14	GENERAL SAUER: but I will.
15	JUSTICE KAGAN: You know, I think
16	that that's the important question in this case.
17	Let's just assume you're dead wrong. How do we
18	get to that result? Does every single person
19	that is affected by this EO have to bring their
20	own suit? Are there alternatives? How long
21	does it take? How do we get to the result that
22	there is a single rule of citizenship that is
23	not that is that is the rule that we've
24	historically applied rather than the rule that
25	the EO would have us do?

1 GENERAL SAUER: Rule 23 would be one 2 natural path, assuming that a class could be 3 certified, which we might dispute in this particular case. 4 JUSTICE KAGAN: Well, you might 5 6 dispute it, and, you know, I mean -- I mean, I 7 think the question is, is there a class that's just all children of people who have entered 8 illegally? You know, is that an appropriate 9 10 class? Can the same thing be done under Rule 11 23, or are you going to tell me that, no, Rule 12 23 has lots of requirements, and you'll never be 13 able to certify a class like that? 14 GENERAL SAUER: Rule 23 provides the 15 equitable tools subject to rigorous criteria, 16 appropriately rigorous criteria, to obtain that 17 kind of class-wide and emergency relief. JUSTICE KAGAN: That suggests to me 18 19 you're going to be standing up here in the next 20 case saying that Rule 23 is inapt for this 21 circumstance with this number of people, maybe 2.2 with some questions that are individual, who 23 So let's put Rule 23 aside, because I 24 got to tell you that does not fill me with great 25 confidence.

1 How else are we going to get to the 2 right result here, which is on my assumption 3 that the EO is illegal? GENERAL SAUER: That would be a 4 profoundly wrong result. But I think what I 5 6 would offer is that, very similar to Labrador 7 against Poe, what the Court should be engaging in here is a balancing of the equitable factors 8 9 as to the scope of remedial relief, not as to the underlying merits. 10 11 And our contention that this exceeds 12 the traditional scope of equity that's reflected in the 1789 Judiciary Act, we're overwhelmingly 13 likely to succeed on those merits for all the 14 15 reasons that I've stated in our briefs and in 16 the second --17 JUSTICE KAGAN: Yeah. I -- I mean, 18 that's a lot of words, and I don't have an 19 answer for, if one thinks -- and, you know, 20 look, there are all kinds of abuses of nationwide injunctions, but I think that the 21 2.2 question that this case presents is that if one 23 thinks that it's quite clear that the EO is 24 illegal, how does one get to that result, in 25 what time frame on your set of rules without the

1 possibility of a nationwide injunction? GENERAL SAUER: On this case and on 2 3 many similar cases, the appropriate way to do it is for there to be multiple lower courts 4 considering it, the appropriate percolation that 5 6 goes through the lower courts, and then, 7 ultimately, this Court decides the merits in a nationwide binding precedent. You have a 8 9 complete inversion of that through the 10 nationwide injunctions with the district 11 courts --12 JUSTICE BARRETT: But, General 13 Sauer --14 JUSTICE KAGAN: Let's say --15 JUSTICE BARRETT: -- are you really 16 going to answer Justice Kagan by saying there's 17 no way to do this expeditiously? 18 GENERAL SAUER: Well, I'll refer to my 19 fourth -- former answer, is Rule 23 provides the tools to do so, multiple injunctions --20 21 JUSTICE BARRETT: But you resisted 2.2 Justice Kagan when she said could the individual 23 plaintiffs form a class? 24 GENERAL SAUER: We -- that has never 25 been briefed in the court below. I do not

- 1 concede that we wouldn't oppose class
- 2 certification in this particular case. There
- 3 may be arguments that this case is or is not
- 4 appropriate for class certification. And if
- 5 just --
- 6 JUSTICE BARRETT: If there were a
- 7 class appropriate for class certification, you
- 8 concede that that could resolve the question
- 9 quickly?
- 10 GENERAL SAUER: Yes, absolutely.
- 11 JUSTICE BARRETT: You concede it could
- resolve the question quickly through precedent?
- GENERAL SAUER: Yes, absolutely, it
- 14 could do so. I mean, we obviously dispute
- 15 the --
- 16 JUSTICE KAGAN: So just on that --
- 17 JUSTICE GORSUCH: And if -- and if the
- 18 Court --
- 19 JUSTICE KAGAN: -- point.
- JUSTICE GORSUCH: Sorry. Sorry.
- 21 Sorry to interrupt. Go ahead, please.
- 22 All right. I got a quick one. I got
- 23 a quick one. I think it's fair --
- JUSTICE KAGAN: Well, I'm going --
- 25 (Laughter.)

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1
                JUSTICE KAGAN: -- I'm going to say
 2
      just -- I'm just going to say just on that
 3
     point, so, you know, let -- let's say that we're
      an individual person even, let's say it wasn't a
 4
      class, and it goes up and gets a ruling from the
 5
      Second Circuit that the EO is illegal.
 6
 7
                Does the government commit to not
 8
     applying its EO in the entire Second Circuit, or
 9
      does it say, no, we can continue to apply the
      rule as to everybody else in the Second Circuit?
10
11
                GENERAL SAUER: I can't say as to this
12
      individual case. Generally, our practice is to
13
     respect circuit precedent within the circuit,
14
     but there are exceptions to that.
15
                JUSTICE KAGAN: Yes, that is generally
16
     your practice --
17
                (Laughter.)
18
                JUSTICE KAGAN: -- and I'm asking
19
     whether it would be your practice in this case.
                GENERAL SAUER: I can't answer because
20
      it would depend on what the lower decision said.
21
2.2
      So there are circumstances, as I was suggesting,
23
      where we think that we want to continue to
      litigate that in other district courts in the
24
25
      same circuit as well as other circuits.
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1 JUSTICE KAGAN: Yeah. So that means 2 it's not even the normal time it takes for 3 everything to get up, you know, through the circuit courts and to the Supreme Court because, 4 even in those circuits that -- that say that the 5 6 EO is illegal, you're going to be saying, no, 7 you know, we only commit to saying it's illegal to this one guy who brought the suit. 8 GENERAL SAUER: Article III and the 9 courts' traditional equitable practices provide 10 11 a range of tools to address that, including a 12 potentially nationwide class action, not --13 nationwide -- a universal injunction is not one 14 of those tools. 15 JUSTICE KAGAN: A nationwide class 16 action, which you say you're going to oppose 17 when that gets -- gets challenged --18 GENERAL SAUER: We are likely to 19 oppose it on the merits. 20 JUSTICE KAGAN: -- when it gets put -you know, proposed. 21 2.2 GENERAL SAUER: Yes, and if it does 23 not meet the rigorous criteria of class certification, the court should not enter that 24 25 injunctive relief. That's -- that's a feature,

- 1 not a bug.
- JUSTICE KAGAN: Do you think -- like,
- 3 suppose -- how about you're not willing to
- 4 commit to abiding by the Second Circuit's
- 5 precedent in my -- suppose that there's a single
- 6 person who brings a suit and it gets all the way
- 7 up to us after three or four or five years, and
- 8 we say, you know, we really do agree with those
- 9 four precedents that Justice Sotomayor started
- 10 with and your EO is illegal. Is -- is -- is
- that only going to bind the one guy who brought
- 12 the suit?
- GENERAL SAUER: No, that would be a
- 14 nationwide precedent that the government would
- 15 respect.
- 16 JUSTICE KAGAN: So, finally, once it
- gets to us after four years, you're going to
- 18 respect that?
- 19 GENERAL SAUER: Yes, and in addition,
- 20 we may well respect circuit-wide precedent in
- 21 the Second Circuit. It just is --
- JUSTICE KAGAN: And -- and -- and for
- four years, there are going to be, like, an
- 24 untold number of people who, according to all
- 25 the law that this Court has ever made, ought to

- 1 be citizens who are not being treated as such.
- 2 GENERAL SAUER: And, in the meantime,
- 3 any of those plaintiffs could have come forward
- 4 and sought, you know, preliminary injunctive
- 5 relief, and they could do so on a class-wide
- 6 basis. There are tools to address this, but the
- 7 universal injunction which was issued here three
- 8 days after the Executive Order was issued is not
- 9 one of those tools.
- 10 CHIEF JUSTICE ROBERTS: Thank you,
- 11 counsel.
- 12 Three -- three years, four years,
- we've been able to move much more expeditiously.
- 14 I think we did the TikTok case in a month.
- 15 Presuming -- I gather an important part of your
- answer is that people can litigate differently
- and one goes -- one will go to Massachusetts,
- 18 the other one will go to Houston, and you'll get
- 19 conflicting decisions fairly quickly.
- 20 Is there any reason why this Court --
- 21 and I gather that's your -- your safety net, is
- 22 that at the end of the day, whenever -- how long
- the day is, this Court can issue a decision and
- it will bind everything else.
- 25 Is there any reason in this particular

- 1 litigation that we would be unable to act
- 2 expeditiously?
- 3 GENERAL SAUER: Absolutely not,
- 4 Mr. Chief Justice.
- 5 CHIEF JUSTICE ROBERTS: Okay. Thank
- 6 you.
- 7 Justice Thomas?
- 8 JUSTICE THOMAS: General, when were
- 9 the first universal injunctions used?
- 10 GENERAL SAUER: We believe that the
- 11 best reading of that is what you said in Trump
- 12 against Hawaii, which is that Wirtz in 1963 was
- really the first universal injunction. There's
- 14 a dispute about Perkins against Lukens Oil going
- back to 1940. And, of course, we point to the
- 16 Court's opinion that reversed that -- that --
- 17 that universal injunction issued by the D.C.
- 18 Circuit and said it's -- it's profoundly wrong.
- Now, if you look at the -- the cases
- that either parties cite, you see a common
- 21 theme. The cases that we cite, like National
- 22 Treasuries, Treasuries Employment Union, Perkins
- 23 against Lukens Oil, Frothingham in -- in
- Massachusetts against Mellon, going back to
- 25 Scott against Donald, in all of those, those are

- 1 cases where the Court considered and addressed
- 2 the sort of universal in that case statewide
- 3 issue of provision of injunctive relief.
- 4 So, when the Court has considered and
- 5 addressed this, it has consistently said you
- 6 have to limit the remedy to the plaintiffs who
- 7 are appearing in court and complaining of that
- 8 remedy.
- 9 JUSTICE THOMAS: So we survived until
- 10 the 1960s without universal injunctions?
- 11 GENERAL SAUER: That's exactly
- 12 correct. And, in fact, those are very
- 13 limited -- very rare even in the 1960s. It
- really exploded in 2007 in our cert petition in
- 15 Summers against Earth Island Institute. We
- 16 pointed out that the Ninth Circuit had started
- doing this in a whole bunch of cases involving
- 18 environmental claims.
- 19 CHIEF JUSTICE ROBERTS: Justice Alito?
- 20 JUSTICE ALITO: You began by outlining
- 21 what you see as the practical problems that have
- 22 been created by universal injunctions.
- 23 If we were to hold that the states
- 24 have standing and if it is possible for a
- 25 plaintiff to get emergency certification of a

- 1 class, would we -- suppose we agreed with you on
- 2 universal injunctions but allowed those other
- 3 two avenues.
- 4 Would those -- would the practical
- 5 problem be rectified to any substantial degree?
- 6 GENERAL SAUER: Certainly, if there
- 7 were an injunction that extended to, you know,
- 8 all of the litigating states, that would cover a
- 9 very substantial portion of the country, and
- 10 also an emergency sort of class certification
- 11 decision might also grant very broad relief.
- 12 JUSTICE ALITO: So the answer is that
- the practical problem would not be solved, and,
- if that's the case, what is the -- what is the
- point of this argument about universal
- 16 injunctions?
- 17 GENERAL SAUER: I think the point is
- 18 that universal injunctions exceed traditional
- 19 principles of Article III and they exceed the
- 20 traditional equitable authority and that's what
- 21 yields all these sort of pathologies, so to
- 22 speak, of the current practice of issuing them
- 23 very, very easily.
- JUSTICE ALITO: Thank you.
- 25 CHIEF JUSTICE ROBERTS: Justice

1 Sotomayor? 2 JUSTICE SOTOMAYOR: You answered 3 Justice Gorsuch, I think, correctly that if Article III precludes universal injunctions, 4 5 then even class actions are illegal. 6 what you're arguing, isn't it? 7 GENERAL SAUER: I disagree with that 8 profoundly. 9 JUSTICE SOTOMAYOR: How could it? If 10 Article III and only prohibits injunctions that 11 affect nonmembers or non-plaintiffs, how could 12 Congress give a remedy like a class action? 13 GENERAL SAUER: In an Article -- or in 14 a Rule 23 class, every member, represented 15 member of the class, has standing by hypothesis. 16 So every single one of them has an Article III 17 injury. And Rule 23, again, provides --18 JUSTICE SOTOMAYOR: So that would be 19 the only method? 20 GENERAL SAUER: It would be very similar to the bill of peace, where all those 21 22 parties --23 JUSTICE SOTOMAYOR: All right. 24 why shouldn't --

GENERAL SAUER: -- even are present in

- 1 a represented capacity are bound. 2 JUSTICE SOTOMAYOR: We can act quickly if we are worried about those thousands of 3 children who are going to be born without 4 citizenship papers that could render them 5 6 stateless in some places because some of their 7 parents' homes don't recognize children of their nationals unless those children are born in 8 their countries. 9 10 They're not going to be receiving 11 federal benefits because that's the claim of 12 the -- of the -- of the plaintiffs here that -of the state plaintiffs, that they're going 13
- 16 Shouldn't we grant cert before

services to those children.

17 judgment on that issue?

14

15

18 If we're afraid that this is or even

to -- they're not going to be able to provide

- 19 have a thought that this is unlawful executive
- 20 action, that it is Congress who decides
- 21 citizenship, not the executive, if we believe,
- 22 some of us were to believe that, why should we
- 23 permit those countless others to be subject to
- 24 what we think is an unlawful executive action,
- 25 as unlawful as an executive taking the guns away

1 from every citizen? 2 GENERAL SAUER: Cert before judgment 3 would be another tool through which this Court could act expeditiously. 4 JUSTICE SOTOMAYOR: Is this the kind 5 6 of case where the equities would call for that? 7 And why wouldn't it? It's a pure legal question: What does the Constitution mean with 8 respect to citizenship? There are no individual 9 10 facts that would alter our conclusion. 11 If we can't do it by a universal 12 injunction because you say Article III doesn't permit that, Article III wouldn't permit us to 13 14 give a universal injunction even if we rule, why 15 don't we grant cert before judgment so that all 16 of these parents would have a firm Supreme Court 17 decision that they can take where? 18 you're saying nobody can grant a universal 19 injunction. 20 GENERAL SAUER: No party has asked for 21 that in this case, and I think one reason is 2.2 that would deny the Court of the benefit of 23 percolation and multiple lower courts of a novel

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and sensitive and important constitutional

24

25

question.

1	JUSTICE SOTOMAYOR: Right now, we have
2	multiple courts we have novel courts who have
3	percolated this issue and said you're violating
4	precedent. Not only precedent, but the plain
5	meaning of the Fourteenth of the
6	Constitution.
7	GENERAL SAUER: Respectfully, I think
8	what we have are lower courts making snap
9	judgments on the merits that ignore the
10	fundamental principle of the Fourteenth
11	Amendment that it was about giving citizenship
12	to the children of slaves, not to the children
13	of illegal immigrants who really were not even a
14	very discrete class at that time.
15	JUSTICE SOTOMAYOR: And there were
16	GENERAL SAUER: And that's the sort of
17	argument that deserves percolation.
18	JUSTICE SOTOMAYOR: and there were
19	some people in Congress who argued against the
20	Thirteenth Amendment just because of that, some
21	people who argued against passing the amendment
22	just because of that, because it would give
23	citizenship to gypsies.
24	GENERAL SAUER: I think the relevant
25	history of the Fourteenth Amendment is the

- 1 statements of Senator Trumbull, who emphasized
- 2 that domicile was the key criteria, and he said
- 3 that in a letter to Andrew Jackson, and there --
- 4 we've cited in our Ninth Circuit briefing --
- 5 JUSTICE SOTOMAYOR: And got
- 6 rejected -- and it got --
- 7 GENERAL SAUER: -- a host of decisions
- 8 that back that up.
- 9 JUSTICE SOTOMAYOR: -- it got rejected
- 10 repeatedly. We can go into the history of
- 11 citizenship, but I still go back to my question.
- 12 You claim that there is absolutely no
- constitutional way to stop, put this aside, to
- 14 stop a president from an unconstitutional act, a
- 15 clearly, indisputably unconstitutional act,
- taking every gun from every citizen, we couldn't
- 17 stop that.
- 18 GENERAL SAUER: I disagree with that
- 19 for the reasons I've said, including the
- 20 equitable tools that are --
- JUSTICE SOTOMAYOR: No, because you
- 22 said to us we'd have to wait until there was a
- 23 final judgment. You're not sure you would
- 24 respect the judgment of every circuit. You're
- 25 not sure that you would respect even a final

- 1 judgment of the Supreme Court because it only
- 2 binds the parties before it and, if there's no
- 3 class action, that only binds the parties before
- 4 the Court.
- 5 GENERAL SAUER: I don't think there is
- 6 a, so to speak, really, really unconstitutional
- 7 exception to the strictures of Article III or
- 8 the scope of equitable authority, and the Court
- 9 should not recognize one because what we see not
- 10 just in this case but in the 39 others is that
- 11 the district courts who are issuing these
- injunctions all passionately disagree with the
- thing that's being challenged in that.
- So that principle that, well, this we
- think is really unconstitutional, therefore, we
- should ignore the general principles of Article
- 17 III, is not a principle the Court ought to
- 18 adopt.
- 19 CHIEF JUSTICE ROBERTS: Justice Kagan?
- 20 JUSTICE KAGAN: So, General, on this
- 21 question of expedition, I mean, it -- it sort of
- depends on the government's own actions in a
- 23 case like this one, where one can expect that
- there is not going to be a great deal of
- 25 disagreement among the lower courts.

Τ	I mean, let's assume that you lose in
2	the lower courts pretty uniformly, as you have
3	been losing on this issue, and that you never
4	take this question to us.
5	I mean, I notice that you didn't take
6	the substantive question to us. You only took
7	the nationwide injunction question to us. I
8	mean, why would you take the substantive
9	question to us?
LO	You're losing a bunch of cases. This
L1	guy over here, this woman over here, you know,
L2	they'll have to be treated as citizens, but
L3	nobody else will.
L4	Why would you ever take this case to
L5	us?
L6	GENERAL SAUER: Well, in this
L7	particular case, we have deliberately not
L8	presented the merits to this Court on the
L9	question of the scope of remedies because, of
20	course, that makes it a clean vehicle where the
21	Court doesn't have to look at the vast
22	JUSTICE KAGAN: You're you're
23	ignoring the import of my question. I'm
24	suggesting that in a case in which the the
25	government is losing constantly there's nobody

- 1 else who's going to appeal, they're winning,
- 2 it's up to you to decide whether to take this
- 3 case to us. If I were in your shoes, there is
- 4 no way I'd approach the Supreme Court with this
- 5 case.
- 6 So you just keep on losing in the
- 7 lower courts, and what's supposed to happen to
- 8 prevent that?
- 9 GENERAL SAUER: Again, I respectfully
- 10 disagree with that forecast of the merits. But,
- in response to the question, what I would say is
- 12 we have an adversarial system. And if the
- government is not -- for example, not respecting
- 14 circuit precedent on the Court's hypothetical in
- 15 the Second Circuit, someone easier in the Second
- 16 Circuit could take the case up and they could
- say, look, the government is violating circuit
- 18 precedent on the hypothetical of multiple
- 19 circuits and so --
- 20 JUSTICE KAGAN: That's the case we're
- going to take, somebody who says -- who -- who
- 22 says, you know, after we've said that -- that
- this all has to be done one by one by one, then
- 24 we're going to take a case from somebody who
- objects to proceeding one by one by one?

1	GENERAL SAUER: I'm not sure I
2	understand the question. I understood the
3	hypothetical to be
4	JUSTICE KAGAN: If you win this
5	challenge and say there is no nationwide
6	injunction and it all has to be through
7	individual cases, then I can't see how an
8	individual who is not, you know, being treated
9	equivalently to the individual who brought the
10	case would have any ability to bring the
11	substantive question to us.
12	GENERAL SAUER: They would bring a
13	lawsuit in the federal district courts against
14	the the government for an injunction
15	protecting them. And if the government wasn't
16	respecting, you know, on the applicable circuit
17	precedent
18	JUSTICE KAGAN: Yeah, and then and
19	then they win, and, again, I mean, you need
20	somebody to lose, but nobody's going to lose in
21	this case. It's just you're
22	(Laughter.)
23	JUSTICE KAGAN: you're going to
24	have, like, individual by individual by
25	individual, and all of those individuals are

- 1 going to win, and the ones who can't afford to
- go to court, they're the ones who are going to
- 3 lose.
- 4 GENERAL SAUER: The tools that are
- 5 provided to address hypotheticals like this,
- 6 again, I --
- 7 JUSTICE KAGAN: This is not a
- 8 hypothetical. This is happening out there,
- 9 right? Every court has ruled against you.
- 10 GENERAL SAUER: We've only had snap
- judgments on the merits. You know, obviously,
- we're fully briefing the merits in the courts of
- appeals, and our arguments are compelling. More
- 14 fundamentally, in response to the question --
- JUSTICE KAGAN: I'm suggesting to you,
- 16 like, the -- the -- the real brunt of my
- 17 question is, in a case like this, the government
- 18 has no incentive to bring this case to the
- 19 Supreme Court because it's not really losing
- 20 anything. It's losing a lot of individual
- 21 cases, which still allow it to enforce its EO
- 22 against the vast majority of people to whom it
- 23 applies.
- 24 GENERAL SAUER: And, again, Rule 23
- 25 provides an avenue to present -- to address

1 those very concerns. 2 JUSTICE KAGAN: Thank you. 3 CHIEF JUSTICE ROBERTS: Justice 4 Gorsuch? JUSTICE GORSUCH: Well, Justice Kagan 5 6 asked my questions better than I could have. 7 (Laughter.) 8 JUSTICE GORSUCH: How do you suggest 9 we reach this case on the merits expeditiously? 10 GENERAL SAUER: There's a number of 11 tools the Court could do that -- we think this 12 case is one that cries out for percolation, that 13 the Court should allow the lower courts to 14 address -- address the merits issue multiple 15 times. It's currently on briefing in three 16 different cases in the First, Fourth, and Ninth 17 Circuits, and we think that that's the 18 appropriate way to do it. If the Court 19 disagreed, obviously --20 JUSTICE GORSUCH: When you lose one of 21 those, do you intend to seek cert? 2.2 GENERAL SAUER: If we lose, yes, 23 absolutely.

CHIEF JUSTICE ROBERTS: Justice

24

25

Kavanaugh?

1 JUSTICE KAVANAUGH: So the technical 2 problem here seems to be class-wide relief without the district courts going through the 3 steps to assess whether a class should be 4 certified, correct? 5 6 GENERAL SAUER: Correct. 7 JUSTICE KAVANAUGH: Okay. And if you win here on this procedural point, it seems very 8 9 likely that the day after there are going to be suits filed all over the place seeking 10 class-wide treatment, maybe statewide classes, 11 12 circuit-wide classes, maybe nationwide classes. 13 I'm sure they're being prepared now, right? 14 And on what basis would you oppose a 15 statewide class? 16 GENERAL SAUER: I could imagine 17 certain bases, and, again, it hasn't -- we 18 haven't briefed this in the lower courts yet. 19 Yes. 20 JUSTICE KAVANAUGH: You've been 21 prompting everyone here that Rule 23 is the 22 cure-all. And I want to explore on what basis 23 you would oppose a statewide class. Just take that one for -- for now. 24 25 GENERAL SAUER: For example -- and,

- 1 again, this is very hypothetical because I'm not
- 2 predicting that we will or will not oppose that.
- 3 We haven't taken a position on that yet. But --
- 4 JUSTICE KAVANAUGH: If you were to
- 5 oppose it, on what basis would you plausibly
- 6 oppose it?
- 7 GENERAL SAUER: There may be problems
- 8 of commonality and typicality, for example. For
- 9 -- for example, there's two different sets of
- groups that are affected by the executive order.
- 11 There are those where the mothers are
- temporarily present and those where the mother
- are illegally present, and in both cases, the
- 14 father is neither a citizen nor a lawful
- 15 permanent resident. So there might be issues of
- 16 typicality. Adequacy of representation might
- 17 very well be an issue. So there would have to
- 18 be that rigorous application of those criteria.
- Now the argument may be this is a case
- that is a natural candidate for a Rule 23(b)(2)
- 21 certification. That may well be true. The
- 22 government hasn't taken a position on that. Our
- 23 position is not that class certification will
- 24 necessarily be granted. Our position is that
- 25 Rule 23 is how these sorts of claims should be

- 1 channeled.
- JUSTICE KAVANAUGH: And you think, I
- 3 think you just said, it's very possible that
- 4 class certification may be granted?
- 5 GENERAL SAUER: It is possible. We
- 6 don't know yet because there was a class
- 7 certification motion filed at the very beginning
- 8 in the Western District of Washington and it was
- 9 just never briefed because, obviously, the
- 10 pathology here is that the nationwide
- injunctions just go blowing past the class
- 12 certification procedures.
- JUSTICE KAVANAUGH: And I guess Rule
- 23(b)(2), for a lot of the cases we've had over
- the past 25 years that you talked about where
- there have been universal injunctions or the
- 17 lower courts have had that, I mean, 23(b)(2)
- 18 could have been used in a lot of those
- 19 presumably, correct? Eviction moratorium,
- 20 student loans, OSHA vaccine mandate. Do you see
- 21 the possibility that 23(b)(2) could have been
- 22 used instead of -- and some of those were APA,
- 23 but put aside the APA issue for now.
- 24 GENERAL SAUER: Yeah, we -- we do set
- 25 aside that issue if I may.

1	JUSTICE KAVANAUGH: Yes. I got it.
2	(Laughter.)
3	GENERAL SAUER: Right. Yes, I agree
4	with that as to some but not in the other cases.
5	It's hard to see how, for example, Biden against
6	Nebraska might have where a state was the
7	plaintiff, might have been a 23(b)(2) class, and
8	Alabama Association of Realtors might have been
9	a much better candidate for that.
10	And, again, we're not taking a
11	position on the individual merits. Our
12	our our overarching point is there's a
13	tradition of equitable of equity in this
14	country that goes back to the English Court of
15	Chancery. And what's happening in these
16	universal injunctions, again, 40 times in this
17	administration, at least 22 times in the last
18	administration, 64 times in the administration
19	before that, is just disregarding those
20	appropriate procedures to to seek this kind
21	of global relief.
22	JUSTICE KAVANAUGH: I want to ask one
23	thing about something in your brief. You said,
24	"And, of course, this Court's decisions
25	constitute controlling precedent throughout the

- 1 nation. If this Court were to hold a challenged
- 2 statute or policy unconstitutional, the
- 3 government could not successfully enforce it
- 4 against anyone, party or not, in light of stare
- 5 decisis." You agree with that?
- 6 GENERAL SAUER: Yes, we do.
- 7 JUSTICE KAVANAUGH: Okay. If you
- 8 prevail here -- the original executive order had
- 9 a 30-day period before it took effect. If you
- 10 prevail here, should there be any pause in -- so
- that things can happen that need to happen for
- 12 30 days or some period of time, or should it
- just -- should we not even worry about that?
- 14 GENERAL SAUER: Yes, we concede that
- the 30-day ramp-up period that the executive
- 16 order itself calls for never started because the
- 17 injunction -- the universal TROs were granted
- 18 almost immediately. And we don't dispute that
- 19 there should be a 30-day ramp-up period for
- another reason as well, which is that we have
- been enjoined from even doing guidance, even
- 22 formulating a policy, and that itself is another
- 23 problem with these injunctions.
- 24 JUSTICE KAVANAUGH: On the day after
- 25 it goes into effect -- this is just a very

- 1 practical question, how it's going to work --
- what do hospitals do with a newborn, what do
- 3 states do with a newborn?
- 4 GENERAL SAUER: I don't think they do
- 5 anything different. What the executive order
- 6 says in Section 2 is that federal officials do
- 7 not accept documents that have the wrong
- 8 designation of citizenship from people who are
- 9 subject to the executive order.
- JUSTICE KAVANAUGH: How are they going
- 11 to know that?
- 12 GENERAL SAUER: The states can
- 13 continue to -- the federal officials will have
- 14 to figure that out essentially.
- 15 JUSTICE KAVANAUGH: How?
- 16 GENERAL SAUER: So you can imagine a
- 17 number of ways that the federal officials
- 18 could --
- 19 JUSTICE KAVANAUGH: Such as?
- 20 GENERAL SAUER: Such as they could
- 21 require a showing of, you know, documentation
- 22 showing legal presence in the country. For a
- 23 temporary visitor, for example, they could see
- 24 whether they're on a B-1 visa, which would
- 25 exclude kind of the birthright citizenship in

- 1 that kind of --
- 2 JUSTICE KAVANAUGH: For all the
- 3 newborns? Is that how it's going to work?
- 4 GENERAL SAUER: Again, we don't know
- 5 because the agencies were never given the
- 6 opportunity to formulate the guidance. They
- 7 would have had 30 days --
- 8 JUSTICE KAVANAUGH: They're only going
- 9 to have 30 days to do this. Do you think they
- 10 can get it together in time?
- 11 GENERAL SAUER: They're under --
- 12 that's what the executive order instructs them
- to do, and, hopefully, they will do so. Again,
- it's a speculative and hypothetical scenario
- 15 because they were enjoined from even starting
- 16 that process.
- 17 JUSTICE KAVANAUGH: And then last
- 18 question. You mentioned before this has come up
- in the last four or five administrations
- 20 primarily. You know, I guess I've thought about
- 21 that a lot too. Why? It seems why might be
- 22 it's harder to get legislation through Congress,
- 23 particularly with the filibuster rule.
- 24 Presidents want to get things done with good
- 25 intentions. The executive branches that work

- 1 for those presidents push hard to -- when they
- 2 can't get new authority -- to stretch or use
- 3 existing authority, and they've been pushing,
- 4 understandably, all with good intentions. All
- 5 the presidents, both parties, right, with good
- 6 intentions, pushing.
- 7 Is that your understanding of why this
- 8 has happened more, that there's less ability to
- 9 get legislation? Because I'm trying to figure
- 10 out the why to your opening about the last four
- or five administrations. I agree with it. I
- think that might be the why, but I'm curious
- 13 what you think.
- 14 GENERAL SAUER: I'm speculating about
- 15 the motivations of the individual district
- judges who grant these, but one explanation
- 17 might be this is an extraordinary power. It's a
- 18 very strong power for the reasons the questions
- 19 have reflected for a district judge --
- JUSTICE KAVANAUGH: Well, let me --
- 21 let me just pause you right there. The -- the
- 22 underlying point is that these district judges
- 23 are not just doing universal injunctions;
- they're finding these actions illegal because
- 25 they're exceeding existing authority, and

- oftentimes we are too when it gets to us,
- 2 finding the actions of presidents of both
- 3 parties unlawful because they exceeded existing
- 4 authority.
- 5 So is that coming up more often
- 6 because of -- why is that coming up more often?
- 7 GENERAL SAUER: You know, it's hard to
- 8 do a historical analysis, but I would draw an
- 9 analogy to the -- to the New Deal, and Professor
- 10 Bray makes this point in his article, that
- 11 actually, there were very, very passionate
- 12 challenges to, you know, sort of nationwide
- 13 policies during the Roosevelt administration and
- they were not addressed by issuing universal
- injunctions. He cites an example where, in one
- 16 case, a policy had been held illegal, and there
- 17 were, like, 1600 injunctions against that policy
- 18 all protecting the individual plaintiffs.
- 19 So if you look at the history, it's
- 20 not clear that what we have of disagreement,
- 21 difficulty, gridlock, getting things through
- 22 Congress and so forth, that's not just
- 23 necessarily new.
- What is new, and is certainly unique
- 25 to the last five presidential administrations,

- 1 is having these given on this widespread basis
- 2 and a systematic basis. Forty, again, in the
- 3 last four months.
- 4 JUSTICE KAVANAUGH: Thank you.
- 5 CHIEF JUSTICE ROBERTS: Justice
- 6 Barrett?
- JUSTICE BARRETT: General Sauer, I
- 8 want to ask you about a potential tension --
- 9 well, no, not a potential tension, an actual
- 10 tension that I see in answers that you gave to
- 11 Justice Kavanaugh and Justice Kagan.
- 12 You resisted Justice Kagan when she
- asked you whether the government would obey,
- 14 within the Second Circuit, a precedent --
- distinguishing between opinions and judgments
- 16 here.
- 17 Did I understand you correctly to tell
- 18 Justice Kagan that the government wanted to
- 19 reserve its right to maybe not follow a Second
- 20 Circuit precedent, say, in New York because you
- 21 might disagree with the opinion?
- 22 GENERAL SAUER: Our general practice
- is to respect those precedents, but there are
- 24 circumstances when it is not a categorical
- 25 practice. It is -- and that is not a new

1	policy
2	JUSTICE BARRETT: This
3	administration's practice or the longstanding
4	practice of the federal government?
5	And I'm not talking about in the
6	Fourth Circuit are you going to respect a Second
7	Circuit. I'm talking about within the Second
8	Circuit. And can you say is that this
9	administration's practice or a longstanding one?
10	GENERAL SAUER: As I understand it,
11	longstanding
12	JUSTICE BARRETT: Really?
13	GENERAL SAUER: policy of the
14	Department of Justice, yes, that we generally
15	as it was phrased to me, generally respect
16	circuit precedent but not necessarily in every
17	case. And certain some examples might be a
18	situation where we're litigating to try and get
19	that circuit precedent overruled and so forth.
20	JUSTICE BARRETT: Well, okay, so I'm
21	I'm not talking about a situation in which,
22	you know, the Second Circuit has a case from
23	1955 and you think it's time for it to be
24	challenged. That's not what I'm talking about.
25	I'm talking about in this kind of

- 1 situation. I'm talking about this week the
- 2 Second Circuit holds that the executive order is
- 3 unconstitutional, and then what do you do the
- 4 next day or the next week.
- 5 GENERAL SAUER: Generally we follow
- 6 that.
- JUSTICE BARRETT: So you're still
- 8 saying "generally."
- 9 GENERAL SAUER: Yes.
- 10 JUSTICE BARRETT: And you still think
- that it's generally the policy, longstanding
- 12 policy of the federal government to take that
- 13 approach?
- 14 GENERAL SAUER: That is my
- 15 understanding.
- 16 JUSTICE BARRETT: Okay. So -- but it
- 17 sounds to me like you accept a Cooper versus
- 18 Aaron kind of situation for the Supreme Court,
- 19 but not for, say, the Second Circuit?
- 20 GENERAL SAUER: I --
- JUSTICE BARRETT: In other words, you
- 22 would respect the opinions and the judgments of
- the Supreme Court, and you're saying you would
- respect the judgment but not necessarily the
- 25 opinion of a lower court.

1 GENERAL SAUER: And, again, and I 2 think in the vast majority of instances our 3 practice has been to respect the opinions as 4 well, in -- in the circuits as well, but my understanding that has not been a categorical 5 6 practice in the way respect for the precedence 7 and the judgments that the Supreme Court has 8 been. 9 JUSTICE BARRETT: So you're not 10 hedging at all with respect to the precedent of 11 this Court? 12 GENERAL SAUER: That is correct. I --13 I believe the --14 JUSTICE BARRETT: All right. 15 GENERAL SAUER: -- quotation from our 16 application directly addresses that. 17 JUSTICE BARRETT: Okay. 18 GENERAL SAUER: And we stand by that 19 completely. 20 JUSTICE BARRETT: Okay. Next question. So this is also a follow-up to some 21 22 of your -- the questions that others have asked 23 you about the merits of the order not being before us. 24

Did I understand your answer to be

- 1 because you think percolation is really
- 2 important for this one?
- 3 GENERAL SAUER: We do think
- 4 percolation is really important for this one.
- 5 But the reason the merits are not before us is
- 6 because we have only submitted a stay
- 7 application on the scope of relief question.
- 8 And as Labrador against Powell
- 9 indicates, the scope of relief is a separate
- 10 question from --
- 11 JUSTICE BARRETT: Oh, I understand
- it's a separate question, but there are plenty
- of times that the government comes to us and
- 14 asks for both.
- 15 GENERAL SAUER: Absolutely. For
- 16 example, recently in the Wilkinson Cox
- 17 application, we did exactly that.
- JUSTICE BARRETT: And the reason why
- 19 you didn't ask for both here is because you
- 20 think that the merits question needs
- 21 percolation.
- 22 GENERAL SAUER: Yes. But also, more
- fundamentally, it illustrates that the very
- 24 problem with these nationwide injunctions is
- 25 they -- they -- they force this rushed, you

- 1 know, fast and furious decisions on the merits.
- 2 So I think it would be very inappropriate in
- 3 this case to come to a stay application saying
- 4 please give us a rushed, you know, decision on
- 5 the merits of something that's very, very --
- 6 JUSTICE BARRETT: But the government's
- 7 done that in other cases too, right?
- 8 GENERAL SAUER: Those cases would be
- 9 different than this case. The example I gave
- 10 earlier we think it's very clear-cut on the
- 11 merits. You know, this one is, we -- we
- 12 concede, a novel and --
- 13 JUSTICE BARRETT: So this one isn't
- 14 clear-cut on the merits from the government?
- 15 GENERAL SAUER: This one -- in this
- 16 case, we want the Court to address the remedial
- 17 issue. If we offered the merits first, that's a
- vehicle problem because the Court has, in many
- 19 cases, just addressed the merits and not the
- 20 remedial issue.
- 21 And it's imperative, from the federal
- 22 government's perspective, that the remedial
- 23 question be addressed.
- JUSTICE BARRETT: Okay. So last
- 25 question is about why that is.

1 Justice Alito asked you well, what's 2 the point of this? If the same thing could 3 happen, which is effectively the EO being enjoined everywhere via class action or because 4 it's necessary to provide complete relief, say, 5 6 to the states, is there any difference, in your 7 view, between, say, a class is certified of all individual plaintiffs and they win, and the 8 executive order classwide -- there's a judgment 9 saying that it can't be enforced? 10 11 Do you want to say, you know, follow 12 up -- is there any practical distinction you see? Why -- why does the government care? 13 14 Is it just the rigors of the 15 certification process, or is it something more? 16 GENERAL SAUER: The -- the rigors of 17 the certification process. Keep in mind that in many of these cases we successfully oppose class 18 19 But we have not -action. 20 JUSTICE BARRETT: Let's assume I think you can't successfully oppose it here for 21 22 individual plaintiffs. 23 GENERAL SAUER: Well, I mean, that 24 opportunity to have our day in court on that is 25 very, very important.

1 JUSTICE BARRETT: I -- I understand. 2 But let's -- let's assume. 3 GENERAL SAUER: Okay. 4 JUSTICE BARRETT: Go with my 5 assumption. 6 GENERAL SAUER: Assuming that we were 7 to lose and -- and oppose --JUSTICE BARRETT: Assume the class is 8 9 certified. Is there any benefit -- if a class is certified -- and let's say that you were 10 11 pointing out that the executive order targets 12 two different kinds of people. Let's assume that it's commonality, because, you know, they 13 14 only target one portion of the order, right? 15 In that circumstance, does the 16 government get anything different -- this is 17 back to Justice Alito's question about what --18 what's it to you, what's the practical difference to you. Do you want to say anything 19 about whether there's a practical difference 20 21 between a universal injunction and a loss in the 2.2 class? 23 GENERAL SAUER: Absolutely. 24 JUSTICE BARRETT: Okay. 25 GENERAL SAUER: Among many others, the

- 1 represented class members are bound in the class
- 2 action context. And that means that, if they
- 3 lose, they are bound by that as well. So
- 4 they're taking a grave risk, so to speak, by
- 5 proceeding through a class action.
- And it has this symmetry, where the
- 7 government is bound if -- if -- if we lose; they
- 8 are bound if we don't lose. And that's a very,
- 9 very important distinction.
- 10 JUSTICE BARRETT: And you would
- 11 respect that judgment?
- 12 GENERAL SAUER: If it were -- yes, if
- it were a judgment. You know, now, we may try
- 14 to litigate in other contexts to try and get a
- 15 different judgment from a different --
- 16 JUSTICE BARRETT: Sure.
- 17 GENERAL SAUER: -- district court, but
- 18 we would be bound by that judgment. As would
- 19 they, and that's the crucial point.
- JUSTICE BARRETT: Okay.
- 21 CHIEF JUSTICE ROBERTS: Justice
- 22 Jackson?
- 23 JUSTICE JACKSON: So as far as I can
- 24 tell, your bottom line seems to be that what you
- 25 call universal injunctions give relief to

- 1 nonparties without going through the necessary
- 2 steps, which you identify in Rule 23.
- 3 Do I have that right? I mean, is that
- 4 sort of like boiled to bare essence what you're
- 5 saying?
- GENERAL SAUER: I would say there's a
- 7 lot more to it --
- JUSTICE JACKSON: Yeah.
- 9 GENERAL SAUER: -- but that's one very
- 10 important one.
- 11 JUSTICE JACKSON: That's a key point
- 12 that I want to focus in on for a moment. I
- guess I don't understand why you are saying that
- 14 these kinds of injunctions are giving relief to
- 15 nonparties.
- 16 First of all, I think they can be also
- 17 easily characterized as focusing only on the
- defendant pursuant to the court's jurisdiction,
- 19 personal jurisdiction, over this person relative
- 20 to the subject matter jurisdiction that the
- 21 court has, and the relief is telling the
- 22 defendant stop doing this thing that the court
- has found to be unlawful.
- So rather than characterizing it as
- 25 a, quote/unquote, universal injunction, I think

- one could easily see that this is just about the
- 2 extent to which the court can constrain a
- 3 defendant over whom it has personal
- 4 jurisdiction, can it do so completely, or just
- 5 partially with respect to -- you know, just say
- 6 stop, with respect to this plaintiff.
- 7 Am I mischarac- -- like, I don't
- 8 understand where this idea of universal
- 9 injunctions comes from in this context.
- 10 GENERAL SAUER: I think the relevant
- 11 distinction is an order. That order is in this
- 12 case the government defendant to cease allegedly
- 13 unlawful activity as to the parties who have
- 14 come into court and sued and one that says to
- the government defendant cease the allegedly
- 16 unlawful activity against everyone in the entire
- 17 world.
- 18 JUSTICE JACKSON: No, just cease it,
- 19 just stop. This thing, this Executive Order --
- 20 I mean, we do this in the APA context all the
- 21 time, right? The statute says you hold that
- 22 the -- you set aside the conduct, right, that
- it's unlawful. And we don't really parse it out
- and say, okay, but it's unlawful only as it
- applies to the plaintiff, or not.

- 1 So it's a very common concept for the
- 2 court to enjoin a defendant from doing
- 3 particular unlawful behavior.
- 4 And what you're now asking us to do is
- 5 to require that the court have an additional
- 6 limitation in its order that says you only have
- 7 to stop doing this with respect to the
- 8 plaintiff. And that's the part that I don't
- 9 understand.
- I -- I guess, I guess, from what I can
- 11 read from your papers and what you've said here,
- 12 that that limitation, you say, comes from this
- principle that, if you don't do that, you would
- 14 be somehow giving relief to nonparties.
- 15 But I -- I -- I wonder if that's
- 16 right. I mean, it seems to me that the relief
- is the judgment that you provide to the
- 18 plaintiff that says stop doing this conduct.
- 19 And you give it only to the plaintiff. That's
- where the limitation comes.
- The plaintiff is the only person who
- 22 can go to court, after you violate this order,
- 23 and enforce it. Other people are incidental
- 24 beneficiaries of -- of a court ordering you to
- 25 follow the law.

1 I mean, that's like everyone in the 2 world. When a court says follow the law, 3 anybody who would have been hurt by your not following the law benefits. 4 Okay. I -- I don't understand why 5 that would limit the court in its ability to 6 7 tell you: Don't do this unlawful conduct. 8 GENERAL SAUER: Two responses to that. JUSTICE JACKSON: Yes. 9 GENERAL SAUER: One is that principle 10 11 that your question referred to is the holding of 12 the Court in Warth against Seldin and it's reaffirmed in Gill against Whitford and Lewis 13 14 against Casey and similar cases, that the 15 authority of the federal court, whether it's 16 viewed as arising under Article III or under its 17 traditional equitably -- scope of equitably 18 authority, is to remediate the injuries to the 19 complaining party. And then to address your 20 question about --21 JUSTICE JACKSON: Can I just stop you 2.2 there? I'm, as the Court, remediating the 23 injury by telling the defendant to stop doing 24 this behavior. The plaintiff has brought a 25 claim that this executive order is unlawful, I

- look at it, I litigate it, and I say you're
- 2 right, stop doing it, you cannot enforce this
- 3 order.
- 4 So I don't understand why that's,
- 5 like, outside the scope of Warth versus Seldin.
- 6 GENERAL SAUER: If the Court in that
- 7 case is imposing a -- what we call an
- 8 indivisible remedy, for example, vacatur under
- 9 the APA -- there's a debate about what "set
- 10 aside" means. Assuming it means to vacate, then
- 11 the remedy that Congress has provided as a
- 12 condition of its delegation to the -- the agency
- is, if one part of the, you know -- if the -- if
- the regulation is unlawful, then the remedy
- granted, which directly remediates the
- 16 plaintiff's injury in that hypothetical, is an
- indivisible remedy that benefits others.
- 18 Here in this case and in all the other
- 19 40 cases, we see something totally different.
- JUSTICE JACKSON: Yeah, I understand.
- 21 GENERAL SAUER: Because it's not
- 22 necessary to remediate --
- JUSTICE JACKSON: Yeah.
- 24 GENERAL SAUER: -- the injuries of the
- 25 plaintiff before them. That is the --

1	JUSTICE JACKSON: I understand. Let
2	me just let me just turn your attention to
3	one other thing because the real concern, I
4	think, is that your argument seems to turn our
5	justice system, in my view at least, into a
6	"catch me if you can" kind of regime from the
7	standpoint of the executive, where everybody has
8	to have a lawyer and file a lawsuit in order for
9	the government to stop violating people's
LO	rights.
L1	Justice Kagan says let's assume for
L2	the purpose of this that you're wrong about the
L3	merits, that the government is not allowed to do
L4	this under the Constitution. And yet it seems
L5	to me that your argument says we get to keep on
L6	doing it until everyone who is potentially
L7	harmed by it figures out how to fire file a
L8	lawsuit, hire a lawyer, et cetera.
L9	And I don't understand how that is
20	remotely consistent with the rule of law, you
21	know, a system and I appreciate that you go
22	back to English common law and the Chancery
23	Court, but they had a different system. The
24	fact that the courts back in English Chancery
2.5	couldn't enioin the king I think is not

- 1 analogous or indicative of what courts can do in
- our system where "the king," quote/unquote, the
- 3 executive is supposed to be bound by the law.
- 4 And the court has the power to say what the law
- 5 is. And so one would think that the court could
- 6 say this conduct is unlawful and you have to
- 7 stop doing it.
- 8 GENERAL SAUER: I think the "catch me
- 9 if you can problem operates in the opposite
- 10 direction where we have the government racing
- 11 from jurisdiction to jurisdiction, having to
- 12 sort of clear the table in order to implement a
- 13 new policy.
- 14 A great example of this is in the
- 15 Shilling litigation where the -- the military
- 16 had a military readiness policy. It was
- 17 universally enjoined by the DDC. It went up to
- 18 the D.C. Circuit. The D.C. Circuit stayed that
- injunction to allow that policy to go into
- 20 effect, and then one hour later, a district
- 21 court on the other side of the country
- 22 universally --
- JUSTICE JACKSON: Can I just ask you
- one final thing, because this relates to also
- 25 something that Justice Kagan said?

1	I would think we'd want the system to
2	move as quickly as possible to reach the merits
3	of the issue, and maybe have this Court decide
4	whether or not the government is entitled to do
5	this under the law. Wouldn't having universal
6	injunctions actually facilitate that?
7	It seems to me that, when the
8	government is completely enjoined from doing the
9	thing it wants to do, it moves quickly to appeal
LO	that to get it to the Supreme Court, and that's
L1	actually what we would want.
L2	What I worry about is similar to what
L3	Justice Kagan points out, is that, if the
L4	government is saying no lower court can
L5	completely enjoin it, it actually means that the
L6	government just keeps on doing the purportedly
L7	unlawful thing, and it delays the ability for
L8	this Court to reach the underlying issue.
L9	GENERAL SAUER: Percolation of novel,
20	sensitive constitutional issues is a merit of
21	our system. It is not a not not a bad
22	feature of the system.
23	JUSTICE JACKSON: Thank you.
24	CHIEF JUSTICE ROBERTS: Thank you,
25	councel

1	Mr. Feigenbaum.
2	ORAL ARGUMENT OF JEREMY M. FEIGENBAUM
3	ON BEHALF OF THE STATE AND CITY RESPONDENTS
4	MR. FEIGENBAUM: Mr. Chief Justice,
5	and may it please the Court:
6	This Court should deny the emergency
7	application because this injunction was properly
8	designed to ensure that the states would get
9	relief for our own Article III injuries as we
LO	suffer significant pocketbook and sovereign
L1	harms from implementation of this executive
L2	order, including from the application of this EO
L3	to the 6,000 babies born to New Jersey parents
L4	out of state every year.
L5	The U.S. prefers alternative
L6	approaches for granting that relief,
L7	alternatives it never raised in the district
L8	court below. But its approach would require
L9	citizenship to vary based on the state in which
20	you're born or even turn on or off when someone
21	crosses state lines, raising serious and
22	unanswered administrability questions, not just
23	for the federal government, but also for the
24	states.
25	And it would offend the text in

- 1 history of the Citizenship Clause itself. Since
- 2 the Fourteenth Amendment, our country has never
- 3 allowed American citizenship to vary based on
- 4 the state in which someone resides, because the
- 5 post-Civil War nation wrote into our
- 6 Constitution that citizens of the United States
- 7 and of the states would be one and the same
- 8 without variation across state lines.
- 9 The U.S. has claimed that Article III
- 10 establishes a bright-line rule barring such
- injunctions no matter the circumstance, even
- where the states do need it to meet their own
- harms, finds no support in this Court's cases or
- in the history of equity.
- 15 Its argument that a single district
- 16 court cannot decide birthright citizenship or
- 17 that we need more percolation on that question
- 18 for the nation overlooks that this Court already
- 19 settled this exact constitutional question 127
- 20 years ago and that this EO is contrary to over a
- 21 century of executive practice.
- Finally, the U.S.'s objection that
- 23 nationwide PIs have simply become too common in
- the last few months, a complaint about other
- injunctions sought by other parties, cannot

- 1 undermine the extraordinary bases for this one.
- 2 The states, who regularly come before this court
- 3 as plaintiff and defendant alike, agree that
- 4 nationwide relief can be reserved for narrow
- 5 circumstances, but it was needed here.
- I welcome this Court's questions.
- 7 JUSTICE THOMAS: Putting the merits
- 8 aside, what -- what do you think is the origin
- 9 of or at least the pedigree of universal
- injunctions, particularly the bill of peace, if
- 11 you would discuss that?
- 12 MR. FEIGENBAUM: Absolutely,
- 13 Your Honor. So there's two categories of these
- broad injunctions. So, first, although we use
- 15 the term "nationwide injunction," if the
- 16 nationwide injunction is actually about meeting
- our harm and the alternatives are not legally or
- 18 practically workable, then it isn't even a
- 19 universal injunction, as I know this Court's
- 20 separate writings has used the term, because
- 21 it's about meeting our own Article III injury,
- 22 which is our basic submission about this case.
- But we do agree that there's some
- 24 space for universal relief. We trace it back
- 25 through the history, from the bill of peace

- 1 through Equity Rule 48, which specifically
- 2 clarified that, in the American equitable
- 3 traditional, it was not always the case that
- 4 universal relief would bind the nonparties even
- 5 as it might benefit the nonparties, continuing
- 6 on to the tax collection injunctions in the 19th
- 7 century and then continuing on as recently as
- 8 this Court's order in AARP.
- 9 So I do think they've always been in
- 10 narrow circumstances. They've never been the
- 11 reflexive or norm of how relief should be
- 12 granted in this country, but they have been
- 13 available.
- I don't think I need that for my case,
- but I do think they're available in narrow
- 16 circumstances.
- 17 CHIEF JUSTICE ROBERTS: You say they
- 18 should be available only in narrow
- 19 circumstances. Why -- why is that?
- 20 MR. FEIGENBAUM: Yeah, so I could -- I
- 21 could offer the three that I think make the most
- sense, but we're mindful of some of the concerns
- 23 that the United States raises.
- 24 We are states who've benefited from
- 25 federal policies. We are states who have our

- 1 own statutes and policies. So sometimes we are
- on the other side of the "v" in cases involving
- 3 universal relief. So we are sympathetic to some
- 4 of the concerns the United States has about
- 5 percolation, about running the table in
- 6 particular cases.
- We just don't think that that supports
- 8 a bright-line rule that says they're never
- 9 available. And we've identified, I think, at
- 10 least three circumstances where they would make
- 11 sense to be available.
- 12 The first would be in cases where the
- alternative ways of remedying the harm for the
- parties are not practically or legally workable.
- 15 That's this case. And I'll return to that in a
- 16 second.
- 17 The second would be congressional
- 18 authorization. So I took my friend on the
- 19 another side to try to set aside vacatur, but I
- 20 do think their Article III objections would
- 21 raise serious questions for remedies like
- 22 vacatur, for remedies like the Hobbs Act, even
- 23 the Hobbs Act, which could set a nationwide PI
- 24 after a multi- -- multi-circuit lottery, might
- 25 ultimately have problems under their view of

- 1 Article III.
- 2 And then the third thing I would say
- 3 is there may be cases in which the alternative
- 4 forms of getting nonparty relief are not legally
- 5 or practically available. So that might be a
- 6 case like AARP or even a case like this one,
- 7 where district courts could consider the
- 8 availability of the class action device, but if
- 9 it couldn't move fast enough because Rule 23
- 10 doesn't include TROs and PIs, if it couldn't
- 11 move fast enough in those contexts, courts might
- 12 need to step in any way.
- But I think we fit in the first bucket
- in this particular case because the alternative
- 15 ways of remedying our particular significant
- 16 pocketbook harms to the tunes of millions of
- 17 dollars can't be remedied, as the district court
- 18 found below, without granting us this kind of
- 19 relief.
- 20 CHIEF JUSTICE ROBERTS: Well, I mean,
- 21 you could benefit through percolation and a
- 22 decision from this Court with reasonable
- 23 expedition.
- MR. FEIGENBAUM: So I have no
- 25 objections to reasonable expedition --

- 1 expedition. We would have no objection to this
- 2 Court even setting supplemental briefing on the
- 3 merits and hearing the merits directly. I'm
- 4 happy to talk about the ways in which I think
- 5 the merits do bear on this emergency
- 6 application.
- 7 But, more fundamentally, to your
- 8 question, Mr. Chief Justice, I would just note
- 9 that I don't think the alternatives actually
- 10 fully remedy our injuries in a couple of
- 11 different respects.
- 12 So I heard my friend on the other side
- to specifically say today that maybe there can
- 14 be an instruction to the federal government that
- at least when you're dealing with the Plaintiff
- 16 States, you treat these individuals kind of as
- though they're citizens even if they're not
- 18 really citizens.
- 19 And that doesn't work, not just for
- 20 the federal government. I agree Justice
- 21 Gorsuch, it may well be that the federal
- 22 government can decide when to take its own
- 23 medicine, but I'm talking about administrability
- 24 burdens on the states and administrability
- 25 burdens on third parties as well.

1	JUSTICE GORSUCH: Can I ask you a
2	question about that, counsel? Your three
3	buckets are very thoughtful. The first one
4	seems to me kind of consistent with traditional
5	equity, which is if if it's required if
6	you got to remedy the claim's harm. That's your
7	point there and you're saying we fall in that
8	bucket. I get that argument.
9	The second bucket is possibly Article
10	III, okay, that Congress could authorize, and
11	maybe has authorized circumstances, but that
12	doesn't answer the equity point.
13	So we come to bucket three. And
14	I'm I'm struggling to understand what the
15	rule is there. You seem to suggest, well, if
16	it's if it's really important, and if you
17	have to act expeditiously, then go ahead, but I
18	think every district court who enters one of
19	these thinks that's what they're doing.
20	So what's the constraint there? If
21	you share the government's concerns about the
22	rise of these things in the last few decades,
23	what what teeth does any of that have?
24	MR. FEIGENBAUM: So I do feel like
25	something of an amigus to this guestion because

- 1 nothing in -- in my injunction rises or falls on
- 2 this claim bucket --
- JUSTICE GORSUCH: Exactly. I --
- 4 MR. FEIGENBAUM: -- so I'm happy to
- 5 answer questions on that.
- 6 JUSTICE GORSUCH: -- I need all the
- 7 amici I can get.
- 8 MR. FEIGENBAUM: Fair enough,
- 9 Your Honor.
- 10 So I would say two things about that.
- 11 The first is it does require reading the history
- in a way more like I do, which does not create a
- 13 single bright-line rule that this is never
- 14 available.
- Obviously if someone reads the
- 16 history as saying --
- JUSTICE GORSUCH: I'm -- I'm spotting
- 18 you that --
- MR. FEIGENBAUM: Great.
- JUSTICE GORSUCH: -- for the purposes
- 21 of my question.
- MR. FEIGENBAUM: Great.
- JUSTICE GORSUCH: I'm not granting --
- 24 the -- granting the --
- MR. FEIGENBAUM: I thought you might

- 1 not, Justice Gorsuch.
- 2 JUSTICE GORSUCH: I'm spotting it to
- 3 you and I'm just saying, well, okay, what would
- 4 that look like and how would that be any
- 5 different from what we have experienced over the
- 6 last few decades.
- 7 MR. FEIGENBAUM: So this is a way in
- 8 which my first bucket and my third bucket are
- 9 actually going to relate for a moment, so I
- 10 think this --
- JUSTICE GORSUCH: No, no, no, no, no,
- 12 no, no --
- MR. FEIGENBAUM: No, It's helpful. I
- 14 promise.
- JUSTICE GORSUCH: No, you don't get to
- 16 squiggle out into the first bucket, okay. We're
- in the third bucket.
- MR. FEIGENBAUM: I'll answer for the
- 19 third bucket which is I think it requires having
- 20 district courts consider the availability of the
- 21 alternative and explaining why it's not workable
- in the case.
- JUSTICE GORSUCH: I think we've told
- them to do that and, you know, gosh, how many
- 25 times do we have to tell them to do that. And I

- 1 think in -- in -- in fairness to them, that's
- 2 what they think they have.
- 3 So let's -- again, would any case over
- 4 the last 30 years come out differently under
- 5 your -- your view of the -- the rule and
- 6 the third bucket and -- and has?
- 7 MR. FEIGENBAUM: Yeah. So there's a
- 8 couple of examples where we don't think
- 9 universal relief was appropriate. I'm most
- 10 familiar with the state litigation, so most of
- 11 my examples will probably come from there, but I
- 12 heard my friend on the other side mention the
- 13 DACA litigation where Texas sought the
- 14 termination of DACA and ultimately the -- the
- 15 Fifth Circuit terminated DACA specific to Texas
- 16 alone.
- 17 And we thought that that decision was
- 18 exactly right because of the nature of the harms
- in that case meant that Texas could get full
- 20 relief for its harms.
- JUSTICE GORSUCH: Well, that -- now
- 22 we're back to the first bucket. We're just
- 23 satisfying the --
- MR. FEIGENBAUM: I -- I see the
- 25 point. I take the point, Your Honor.

1 JUSTICE GORSUCH: I mean, I get that 2 we're going to always revert back to the first 3 bucket but that means the third bucket is empty. MR. FEIGENBAUM: I don't -- I -- I --4 I totally take the point. I think AARP is a 5 good illustration of the third bucket that this 6 7 Court confronted recently where it was the case that there was this rush just a few hours, not 8 possible to go through class certification. 9 10 You heard my friend on the other side 11 talk about the rigors of class certification, 12 and I don't think my friend on the other side would agree it could be done in three hours 13 14 through the night and so there were a necessity 15 to step in --16 JUSTICE KAVANAUGH: Do you -- do you 17 agree about the riggers of class certification? It seems to me that 23(b)(2) classes and -- and 18 you probably, if -- if you have to, are going to 19 20 be arguing that they're not so rigorous to meet 21 for injunctive relief for national policies that 2.2 are uniform. 23 MR. FEIGENBAUM: So the most important thing that hasn't come up in the discussion this 24 25 morning yet, is that they're not available for

- 1 state litigation. It talks about persons. It
- 2 talks about appointment of class counsel. It
- 3 talks about going through the certification
- 4 process.
- 5 States, and this Court's precedents
- 6 are really clear about parents back trying
- 7 lawsuits. States can't represent those
- 8 individuals in class actions nor would we try
- 9 to. They can't represent us and you don't have
- 10 classes of states.
- 11 So the whole framework doesn't apply
- 12 to state litigation. So I understood how it
- might come up as an alternative for some other
- cases you might see in the future, but for the
- injunction you have in front of you from the
- 16 states, the whole class device doesn't even work
- 17 as an alternative.
- JUSTICE BARRETT: But --
- 19 MR. FEIGENBAUM: So I don't see how it
- 20 can be the answer for us.
- 21 JUSTICE BARRETT: But why should you
- 22 care if the class device doesn't work as an
- 23 alternative if you have bucket one.
- Like you -- you don't really need the
- 25 class device. I think what you're saying is

- 1 will it be frustrating for states not to have
- 2 the class device when the individuals have it,
- 3 but I don't see why that's true if giving you
- 4 complete relief in -- in bucket one solves your
- 5 problem.
- 6 MR. FEIGENBAUM: So I should be very
- 7 clear and I'm sorry for the confusion on this.
- 8 This goes back to my colloquies with Justice
- 9 Gorsuch.
- 10 When states are seeking the relief,
- 11 states are seeking it in bucket one and bucket
- 12 two. As an amicus to the other injunction --
- JUSTICE BARRETT: I see.
- MR. FEIGENBAUM: -- I recognize courts
- are looking at, I think bucket three could be
- 16 available.
- 17 We aren't seeking relief when it falls
- 18 into bucket three because as I was saying
- 19 earlier, we're not going to be seeking relief
- 20 for other parties. This Court's cases like
- 21 Brackeen make very clear, we aren't suing to
- 22 indicate the injuries that third parties and our
- 23 residents are suffering.
- 24 So when states come before you, the
- 25 questions that you would ask are: Are the

- 1 alternative ways of remedying our injury going
- 2 to be practically or legally workable? And
- 3 you're going to ask did Congress authorize it,
- 4 which gets to the vacatur question which gets to
- 5 the Hobbs Act question and so on.
- 6 And on that first bucket, which I
- 7 think describes this case well, I had a hard
- 8 time with some of the colloquies earlier today
- 9 because I think they were missing some really
- serious burdens that the states are still going
- 11 to have to bear in this case if we get something
- 12 less than a nationwide injunction.
- I think it's going to hinder the
- 14 administration of our benefits programs. I
- think it's going to hinder the participation in
- our benefits programs. And I think it's going
- to produce unprecedented chaos on the ground.
- 18 And I -- I might offer examples of
- 19 each.
- 20 JUSTICE GORSUCH: Before you do, I'm
- 21 sorry. One more.
- MR. FEIGENBAUM: No, no.
- JUSTICE GORSUCH: How would you
- 24 this -- how would you get the merits of this
- 25 case to us promptly.

1 MR. FEIGENBAUM: So, there's two 2 different ways that this Court could think about 3 doing it. So the first is, I heard a couple 4 colloquies earlier today to suggest that maybe 5 the states should sort of have to take some of 6 7 that -- the burdens on ourselves because, okay, 8 some people move in, maybe that's just something 9 that equity shouldn't care about, and it may be 10 true, this is Hornbook equity, that in some 11 cases states don't get complete relief for the 12 harms they suffer, we just have to eat some of 13 the administrability burdens. 14 But the merits have always come into 15 that because that is just about remedying a party's own injuries and the strength of the 16 17 ability to remedy our injuries is going to turn on a peek on the merits. 18 19 This is partially Ohio versus EPA and 20 building on Justice Kavanaugh's Labrador 21 concurrence where this Court said, you might 2.2 have some states who really like a policy and 23 some states who want to get relief from the 24 policy, and how you reconcile those two things, 25 who should get relief, who should benefit from

- 1 the policy, will turn in part on a peek at the
- 2 merits because --
- JUSTICE GORSUCH: Yes.
- 4 MR. FEIGENBAUM: -- we have a greater
- 5 right to relief from it.
- 6 JUSTICE GORSUCH: I appreciate that.
- 7 How do we get to the merits fast?
- 8 MR. FEIGENBAUM: This Court could set
- 9 supplemental briefing on the merits by an order
- 10 tomorrow if it wished specifically to say the
- 11 federal government has proposed that states get
- 12 less than complete relief in this case. We
- could not possibly think about giving the states
- less than complete relief without looking at the
- 15 merits. We want briefing.
- JUSTICE GORSUCH: Okay. Put that
- 17 aside. Assume we've just got the remedial
- 18 question before us and we're going to decide the
- 19 remedial question one way or the other, then
- 20 what?
- 21 MR. FEIGENBAUM: Oh, then I share some
- of Justice Kagan's concerns from earlier that
- 23 if --
- 24 JUSTICE GORSUCH: So I -- I appreciate
- 25 you share those concerns. How would you address

- 1 them? How -- how -- how would the states plan
- 2 to get this case to the Court promptly?
- 3 MR. FEIGENBAUM: I think it's very
- 4 hard to think about how the states would lose
- 5 this case given the state of Supreme Court
- 6 precedent. It creates very weird incentive on
- 7 the certiorari docket when there's already
- 8 binding precedent from this Court.
- 9 We do suffer harms from the
- 10 application of this Executive Order beyond our
- 11 borders that we need relief from. If we don't
- 12 get a full remedy from that, I suppose we could
- 13 ultimately seek cert before judgment on the
- 14 basis that we still have Article III injuries
- that we're suffering, but we'd be asking this
- 16 Court to grant review from a circuit precedent
- 17 we won on the basis that we have continued
- 18 injuries.
- 19 It's not impossible. This Court knows
- 20 best when it grants cert and when it doesn't. I
- 21 would think it's not the cleanest way to tee up
- 22 a case historically and so it would raise some
- 23 real concerns to the colloquies earlier today
- 24 about how this case would ultimately come before
- 25 this Court.

JUSTICE ALITO: Are -- are you telling 1 2 us that we really can't decide the question that we asked to have briefing and argument on 3 without taking a -- a peek at the merits? 4 MR. FEIGENBAUM: So I'm not saying 5 6 that at all. So there's two different ways to 7 think about this case, Your Honor. One is to say, absolutely, the states 8 9 need to get complete relief for their injuries 10 and then let's figure out the best way to do it, 11 and we think the alternatives are not workable 12 and not legal. If this -- if this Court is going to 13 14 entertain giving us anything less than full 15 redress for all of the Article III injuries we 16 bring before you, I don't see how that can be 17 entertained without a peek at the merits, because you always look at the merits to decide 18 19 should we get a hundred percent or 90 percent of our own injuries redressed. 20 21 JUSTICE ALITO: Well, would a decision 2.2 in -- on the matter that is I understood to be 23 before us, the narrow question that I understood 24 to be before us, make any -- be helpful in any way if we do not peek at the merits and we also 25

1 do not decide whether you have standing? 2 MR. FEIGENBAUM: So I'm not sure how 3 you could decide whether or not we got an appropriate scope of relief without figuring out 4 what our own injuries are because how you 5 decide -- this is the United States' own 6 7 argument -- how you decide whether or not we should get relief for our own injuries turns on 8 9 what our injuries are that require relief. 10 And so I do think we have pretty 11 significant pocketbook injuries like in Nebraska 12 to the tunes of millions of dollars, and whether we get those remedies or don't get those 13 14 remedied is going to turn on the merits, is 15 going to turn on the nature of the harms, and 16 then, ultimately, the workability of the 17 alternatives. 18 CHIEF JUSTICE ROBERTS: Thank you, 19 counsel. Justice Thomas? 20 21 Justice Alito? 2.2 JUSTICE ALITO: Well, General Sauer 23 began by outlining problems that he sees being 24 created by universal injunctions, and he said 25 that the issue was a -- a nonideological issue

- 1 and a nonpartisan issue.
- Do you agree with that?
- 3 MR. FEIGENBAUM: I do think presidents
- 4 of both parties have objected to nationwide
- 5 injunctions. I agree.
- 6 JUSTICE ALITO: So what do you say
- 7 about the -- the practical problem? So put out
- 8 of -- let's put out of our minds the merits of
- 9 this and just look at the abstract question of
- 10 universal injunctions.
- 11 What is your response to what some
- 12 people think is the practical problem? And the
- 13 practical problem is that there are 680 district
- 14 court judges, and they are dedicated and they
- are scholarly, and I'm not impugning their
- 16 motives in any way. But, you know, sometimes
- they're wrong, and all Article III judges are
- vulnerable to an occupational disease, which is
- 19 the disease of thinking that I am right and I
- 20 can do whatever I want.
- Now, on a multi-member appellate
- 22 court, that is restrained by one's colleagues,
- but trial judge, the trial judge sitting in the
- trial judge's courtroom is the monarch of
- 25 that -- of that realm, and there are situations

- 1 in which trial judges -- the -- the president
- does something, it could be President Trump, it
- 3 could be President Biden, it could be President
- 4 Obama. The trial judge says this is unlawful
- 5 and I'm going to -- I'm going to order -- I'm
- 6 going to enjoin it, and I'm so -- I'm convinced
- 7 I'm right, so I'm not going to stay the
- 8 injunction. And then an application is made to
- 9 the court of appeals to stay the injunction.
- 10 The court of appeals gives it the back of the
- 11 hand, and then the case comes immediately to us
- in the context of an emergency application.
- And some of us have said, well, we
- don't think we should do anything in those
- 15 situations unless the -- unless it is
- indisputably clear that the court below was
- 17 wrong. So what do you say to that practical
- 18 problem?
- 19 MR. FEIGENBAUM: So we're mindful of
- 20 the practical problems. I will say the states
- 21 have had a through line as well across
- 22 administrations. We have never believed, even
- 23 as nationwide injunctions restrained policies
- that we favored, that they were categorically
- off the table. We've always taken the position

- 1 that they are sometimes available in narrow
- 2 circumstances, whether we like the policy or
- 3 don't like the policy.
- 4 And so you might have some cases where
- 5 the nature of the harm -- this is the DACA
- 6 example from my friend on the other side --
- 7 where the nature of the harm, which was Texas
- 8 saying it had to give benefits to residents in
- 9 the state, is actually entirely remedied by a
- 10 nationwide -- a state-only injunction that
- 11 applies just to Texas, because that might
- 12 incentivize individuals to leave Texas, and then
- 13 Texas doesn't have to give them benefits
- 14 anymore. So you might have a case like that.
- But sometimes you are going to have
- 16 cases where it is impossible to remedy the
- 17 state's own injuries, and the alternatives are
- 18 not practically or legally workable, and that
- 19 describes this case perfectly.
- 20 And so I don't think the answer is a
- 21 bright line that means, even in those
- 22 situations, it's not possible for the states to
- 23 get relief.
- 24 JUSTICE ALITO: In deciding the -- the
- 25 question that is before us here, do you think we

- 1 should -- never mind. I withdraw that.
- I have no further questions.
- 3 CHIEF JUSTICE ROBERTS: Justice
- 4 Sotomayor?
- JUSTICE SOTOMAYOR: Let's start with
- 6 an answer you've been trying to give and haven't
- 7 completed, which are -- the General suggested
- 8 there were two ways that your injuries could be
- 9 remedied. He claimed they were both presented
- 10 to the court below. I didn't see that, but
- 11 that's a matter that we could check on.
- Do you agree with me that they were
- 13 not presented to the courts below?
- MR. FEIGENBAUM: I do agree with you.
- 15 So I want to be very clear because I think
- there's some confusion across the briefing here.
- 17 JUSTICE SOTOMAYOR: Right.
- MR. FEIGENBAUM: We agree -- and I
- 19 don't think the First Circuit disagreed. They
- 20 objected to the nationwide injunction --
- JUSTICE SOTOMAYOR: They did.
- 22 MR. FEIGENBAUM: -- in the district
- 23 court. And we attached the briefing and we
- 24 attached the transcript.
- 25 What they didn't do is provide some of

- 1 the alternatives they've pressed in two
- 2 sentences in their emergency application.
- JUSTICE SOTOMAYOR: That's what I
- 4 mean. Okay.
- 5 MR. FEIGENBAUM: Yes. They did not
- 6 press --
- 7 JUSTICE SOTOMAYOR: So now go through
- 8 why their -- why you question whether their two
- 9 suggestions now that they've only raised before
- 10 us are inadequate to remedy all of your harms.
- MR. FEIGENBAUM: Yeah. So -- so --
- 12 JUSTICE SOTOMAYOR: Because complete
- 13 relief, he says that there is situations in
- 14 which you grant relief that will benefit third
- 15 parties.
- 16 Why is your relief necessary to give
- 17 you complete relief even though it benefits
- 18 these parents in other jurisdictions?
- 19 MR. FEIGENBAUM: So I don't think
- there's any serious dispute that if you limit
- 21 the relief to babies born in New Jersey, we
- won't get complete relief, because 42 U.S.C.
- 23 1396a, the Medicaid statute, requires us, the
- 24 states, to do the citizenship verification. So
- 25 it's not true that they can simply handle it all

- 1 for themselves. Federal law requires us to
- 2 undertake those responsibilities.
- And we have in New Jersey 6,000 babies
- 4 born out of state every year when they come into
- 5 the state and they need benefits. The Boyle
- 6 declaration from Massachusetts suggests that's
- 7 going to cover 40 percent of kids. They come
- 8 into our state. They need benefits. We have to
- 9 do citizenship verifications, which is a burden
- 10 for us.
- 11 JUSTICE SOTOMAYOR: That's for you in
- 12 New Jersey, but there's I think -- how many
- 13 states?
- MR. FEIGENBAUM: That's just an
- 15 example. We have --
- 16 JUSTICE SOTOMAYOR: Yeah.
- 17 MR. FEIGENBAUM: -- we have 23
- 18 attorneys general in this -- exactly right.
- 19 JUSTICE SOTOMAYOR: Twenty-three
- 20 attorney generals, so 23 states are going to
- 21 have babies who were born somewhere else without
- 22 a birth certificate that you're now, if they
- 23 move into your state, going to have to do
- 24 checking on.
- 25 MR. FEIGENBAUM: And that comes to the

- 1 United States' alternative, Justice Sotomayor,
- which is they say, okay, maybe their citizenship
- 3 turns on when they enter New Jersey, maybe for
- 4 some purposes, maybe for all purposes, depending
- 5 on which sentence you're looking at in the
- 6 emergency application.
- 7 And there are three problems either
- 8 way. The first is it will undermine the
- 9 administration of our benefits programs. So
- individuals will move in. When they were born,
- 11 they were treated as noncitizens. They didn't
- 12 get Social Security numbers because they
- wouldn't have been eligible for the enumeration
- 14 at birth program in their states, and they're
- going to arrive and they're going to seek
- 16 benefits that we administer.
- 17 But federal law requires that they
- 18 have Social Security numbers for the
- 19 administration of those benefits. This is 7
- 20 U.S.C. 2025 for SNAP. This is 42 U.S.C. 1320b-7
- 21 for TANF, for Medicaid, and so on. So they're
- 22 going to need to have Social Security numbers.
- They're going to arrive without them even though
- they were under this Court's precedents citizens
- 25 who should have been in the enumeration-at-birth

- 1 program, who should have had Social Security
- 2 numbers. And it's going to be a burden on us
- 3 either in delaying the benefits, training county
- 4 social service workers in having to administer
- 5 benefits without the -- without the SSNs on a
- 6 provisional basis.
- 7 So that's the administration of the
- 8 benefits.
- 9 Let me give you an example on
- 10 participation, which we have responsibility for
- 11 as well. These are babies who were told that
- 12 they -- their families were told that the babies
- are undocumented, they aren't citizens, they're
- 14 not eligible for these federal programs when
- 15 they were born.
- They come into our states, they think
- they're now ineligible. They don't realize
- 18 their child is a citizen entitled to these
- 19 federal benefits. And so what will happen is we
- 20 bear the responsibility putting in our own state
- 21 Medicaid plans of getting them enrolled, and
- 22 that's 42 U.S.C. 1367bb.
- So we're responsible for putting in
- our plan how we're going to enroll them. We
- 25 have to incur substantially more costs to get

- 1 them enrolled in our programs because they think
- they're undocumented, they think they're
- 3 ineligible because of where they were born, even
- 4 though their citizenship has now turned on when
- 5 they cross state lines.
- And then the last point is we've never
- 7 in this country's history since the Civil War
- 8 had your citizenship turn on when you cross
- 9 state lines. So we don't have answers to these
- 10 workability questions, not just because it
- 11 wasn't presented in the district court, not just
- 12 because it's two sentences in an emergency
- application, but because, for over a century,
- 14 executive practice has been uniformly to the
- contrary, building on this Court's decision in
- Wong Kim Ark. So we genuinely don't know how
- this could possibly work on the ground.
- 18 And although my friend on the other
- 19 side has complained that they weren't able to
- 20 give guidance, the states didn't object to
- 21 guidance. The states have no quarrel with
- internal steps, and if they want to put out
- 23 guidance that says, if Wong Kim Ark gets
- overruled, this is that we would do, that's
- 25 fine. What they can't do is require us to take

- 1 any steps or issue guidance that requires
- 2 everyone to start planning for something that is
- 3 so patently against this Court's own settled
- 4 precedent.
- 5 JUSTICE SOTOMAYOR: Now, going back to
- 6 the history question that Justice Thomas started
- 7 with, you relied on the bill of peace. You
- 8 relied on the tax injunction of the 19th century
- 9 and not so far in the 19th century -- 1891 --
- just about the time that the Fourteenth
- 11 Amendment was adopted, okay?
- 12 At any rate, there are other cases,
- one of our amici points out to them, the Pierce
- 14 versus Society of Sisters case, the West
- 15 Virginia State Board of Education case, those
- 16 were earlier than the 1960s. In -- in the
- 17 Pierce versus Society of Sisters, the Court
- affirmed a universal injunction that wasn't even
- 19 sought by the parents, correct?
- MR. FEIGENBAUM: That's right.
- 21 JUSTICE SOTOMAYOR: And there, what we
- 22 said was -- there, states were imposing criminal
- 23 penalties on parents who sent their children to
- 24 private school, and just two plaintiff schools
- 25 sued against that penalty. They sought and won

- 1 an injunction that categorically restrained the
- 2 state from enforcing the law. That was 1925,
- 3 correct?
- 4 MR. FEIGENBAUM: That's right.
- 5 JUSTICE SOTOMAYOR: And similarly,
- 6 with West Virginia, saluting the flag by Jehovah
- 7 Witnesses, the injunction was universal.
- 8 So, in answer to Justice Gorsuch's
- 9 point, we've had universal injunctions in some
- 10 form, correct, since the founding?
- 11 MR. FEIGENBAUM: That's right. If I
- can make two points on that, Justice Sotomayor?
- JUSTICE SOTOMAYOR: In equity,
- 14 correct?
- 15 MR. FEIGENBAUM: Exactly. So
- 16 there's -- so I agree with your reading of the
- equitable history, that it goes back from the
- 18 English Bill of Peace, through Equity Rule 48,
- 19 through the tax collection injunctions, through
- 20 Equity Rule X, through the Ex Parte Young period
- 21 you're referring to, through AARP just a few
- 22 weeks ago. So I agree with your read of the
- 23 history.
- But I just want to make one quick
- 25 point.

1	JUSTICE SOTOMAYOR: Well, let me go
2	ahead, make your point, but I want to finish
3	this thought, which is: You started earlier by
4	saying universal injunctions should not be the
5	preferred remedy, and it should be limited.
6	You've suggested three ways to limit it.
7	I agree with you, those three and
8	yours clearly falls within one, that's your
9	claim. But the point that I think my two other
LO	colleagues are raising is: How do we ensure
L1	district courts are following that?
L2	MR. FEIGENBAUM: So so if I can
L3	make I point about the history and then make a
L4	point about the guidance.
L5	On the history, I understand that the
L6	United States at the podium today tries to make
L7	the history all about what it calls
L8	indivisibility cases, cases where there's just a
L9	unitary on/off switch as it were and either
20	something happened or it didn't happen. Like a
21	redistricting plan needs to be completely redone
22	or a power plant is on or it's off.
23	But if I can give an example that
24	shows it's not quite so limited and it very much
5	requires looking more broadly at what!s

- 1 practically or legally workable on the ground.
- 2 I would point to apportionment as an example.
- 3 So say that there's an Executive Order
- 4 that says: We're just not going to count
- 5 minors, people under 18, in apportionment
- 6 anymore; we're only going to count people who
- 7 are voting age. And the State of New York files
- 8 a lawsuit, and it wins its lawsuit, and all of
- 9 its 17-and-under-year-olds get counted for
- 10 apportionment.
- 11 That isn't indivisible in any way.
- 12 It's not a redistricting plan. It's not a power
- 13 plant. But it is going to skew apportionment in
- 14 a way that is totally unfair practically and
- 15 legally to third parties because now
- 16 17-year-olds are being counted in New York, but
- they're not being counted in Oklahoma.
- 18 And you would end up messing up
- 19 apportionment between states for that very
- 20 reason. And that shows, as just a broader
- insight, that we've always looked to the harms
- 22 that third parties will suffer as negative
- 23 externalities of court orders.
- 24 And that's our submission here, that
- 25 to accept what the United States wants as

- 1 against our injunction and to say that it turns
- on or off when you cross state lines doesn't
- 3 just harm the administration of our benefits,
- 4 doesn't just even harm enrollment in our
- 5 benefits, also puts chaos on the ground where
- 6 people's citizenship turns on and off when you
- 7 cross state lines.
- 8 If ICE has initiated a removal
- 9 proceeding when you live in Philly and you move
- 10 to Camden, I suppose the ICE removal is supposed
- 11 to turn off at that point potentially because
- 12 your citizenship status has changed.
- 13 I don't know if you lose it if you
- move back to Philly, whether you were born in
- New Jersey or born in Philly, moved to Camden
- and moved back. It's a very porous part of the
- 17 country. I don't know if the ICE removal turns
- 18 back on when you cross state lines again.
- 19 And that sort of chaos on the ground,
- those implementation questions we don't know,
- 21 are serious third-party harms we've always taken
- 22 into account.
- 23 This is North Carolina versus
- 24 Covington, where courts ask what's workable as
- an injunction matter. And it's also the Winter

1 Factors, where Factor 3 looks at the balance of 2 the equities between the parties and workability and harm to them, and Winter Factor 4 looks at 3 public interest and the negative externalities 4 and workability problems we're imposing on 5 6 others. 7 CHIEF JUSTICE ROBERTS: Justice Kagan? JUSTICE KAGAN: General, you've had a 8 9 chance to talk about your administrative costs 10 and the workability problems that New Jersey 11 would confront, but how about this magnet 12 problem? 13 I mean, it strikes me as -- as 14 completely obvious that if you have two states 15 and they have different rules for citizenship 16 and one benefits babies and the other doesn't 17 that everybody moves to the state where the more 18 favorable rule exists. But why is it that 19 preventing that harm from happening should count 20 as providing you with complete relief? 21 MR. FEIGENBAUM: So I think, actually, 2.2 my point is somewhat different. I agree with 23 you that the incentives could potentially factor 24 into the calculus because we're ultimately 25 experiencing some harm we might not -- might not

- 1 otherwise to our benefits programs.
- 2 But my point is different. Even if
- 3 you just take normal migration -- for New
- 4 Jersey, 6,000 babies born out of state, 8
- 5 percent -- or 8 million every year traveling
- 6 across state lines -- without worrying about the
- 7 incentives, we're going to be looking at that
- 8 problem for how we administer benefits programs
- 9 because --
- 10 JUSTICE KAGAN: I got that. Are
- 11 you -- are you saying we shouldn't consider the
- 12 fact --
- MR. FEIGENBAUM: No, I think you can.
- 14 I think you can, Your Honor, and it's because of
- 15 the nature of three things together.
- 16 One is it's the movement, but it's not
- 17 just the movement. Two is it's the fact that
- 18 citizenship historically was something you had
- 19 at birth or didn't have at birth, and so you
- 20 arrived to our state in theory without
- 21 birthright citizenship because you would have
- been told when you were born in the hospital
- 23 what you have or don't.
- 24 And then the third, and this is really
- 25 important, is the way that citizenship permeates

- 1 so much not just for individuals but for what
- 2 states are obligated to do, whether it's
- 3 citizenship verification eligibility, whether
- 4 it's enrollment in our own programs.
- 5 Over and over, you see citizenship in
- 6 Congress's own laws as the on-or-off switch for
- 7 our own administration of benefits. And that's
- 8 actually sort of unique.
- 9 So I don't think every time people
- 10 move between states you automatically need to
- 11 have a nationwide injunction. What you need is
- 12 a demonstration about how that's going to
- 13 contribute to the state's harm.
- 14 And then -- I think this is really
- important to colloquies you were having with the
- 16 United States earlier -- a court could, in an
- 17 appropriate case, say: Well, sure, state, you
- might have to keep some of the harm; we're only
- 19 going to remedy 90 percent of your harm because
- it's too disruptive to everyone else.
- 21 But I don't think you can do that in a
- 22 case without looking at the merits because
- 23 whether we should get to a hundred percent of
- our injuries taken care of or 90 percent of our
- 25 injuries taken care of will always involve the

- 1 strength of our merits showing.
- 2 And I don't see how you could have a
- 3 stronger merits showing than we have here: 127
- 4 years of Supreme Court precedent, over a century
- 5 of executive practice, and congressional
- 6 statutes that codified both into law in 1940 and
- 7 1952.
- 8 And given that strength of the merits
- 9 and the settled precedent, combined with our
- 10 nature of harm, I don't think this is a close
- 11 case for why we need national relief to remedy
- 12 our injuries.
- 13 JUSTICE KAGAN: Thank you.
- 14 CHIEF JUSTICE ROBERTS: Justice
- 15 Gorsuch?
- 16 Justice Kavanaugh?
- 17 Justice Barrett?
- JUSTICE BARRETT: I have a question
- 19 about the history.
- 20 So Grupo tells us that we have to look
- 21 back to 1789 and the High -- High Court of
- 22 Chancery. So I appreciate that there have been
- 23 some cases from later, and you were talking
- 24 about some of those with Justice Sotomayor from
- 25 the early 20th century, maybe the late 19th

- 1 century.
- 2 Can you say -- let's say that I think
- 3 the bill of peace is more like a
- 4 representational suit that is a forerunner to
- 5 the class action. What do you think is your
- 6 very best example of something that would look
- 7 at the period that Grupo tells us is relevant
- 8 that would support something that looks like
- 9 universal relief?
- 10 MR. FEIGENBAUM: So I do think from
- 11 1789, from English equity, I do think the best
- 12 example is the bill of peace, and so I
- 13 understand if we see it differently.
- 14 JUSTICE BARRETT: Right.
- MR. FEIGENBAUM: It's a fair point.
- I will just say quickly on Grupo
- 17 Mexicano, its own tradition -- and this is sort
- of the analogical reasoning you talked about in
- 19 Rahimi -- it looks at that period, but at other
- times, we've also looked at American tradition
- 21 to see analogically how we've liquidated that
- 22 tradition or not.
- 23 And in American equitable tradition,
- 24 this is Equity Rule 48, which specifically said
- 25 nonparties are not bound by certain relief even

- 1 as they may benefit from it.
- 2 And I take that to be the principal
- 3 reason my friend on the other side thinks that
- 4 bills of peace look much more like class actions
- 5 than they ultimately look like universal
- 6 injunctions. And Equity Rule 48 was to the
- 7 contrary. Tax collection injunctions in
- 8 American history were to the contrary.
- 9 So I just have a hard time with that
- 10 reading even though I agree with you that you
- would be starting in the founding trying to do
- 12 analogical reasoning based on what Grupo
- 13 Mexicana says but using American equity to
- 14 answer some of the unresolved ambiguities in
- 15 this case.
- 16 JUSTICE BARRETT: Oh, I completely
- agree with you need some analogical reasoning,
- 18 you know, and I don't think that Grupo
- 19 completely rules that out. And, I mean, I
- 20 think, even if you talked about the distinction
- 21 between a -- a bill of peace and a class action,
- you would be looking at something that doesn't
- have to be called the same thing.
- I think the problem is when we have
- such a party-centric history, if it has to be

- 1 reasoning that fits within the confines, then I
- 2 think we have a little bit of trouble.
- 3 Let me -- let me just ask you one
- 4 question about relief. So let's say that I
- 5 think that the states do need something broader
- 6 in order to have complete relief even if the
- 7 universal injunction is too broad and
- 8 inconsistent with Grupo.
- 9 That isn't how the court below
- 10 approached the question because that isn't what
- 11 the court below thought it had to do because the
- 12 court below thought it could just enter a
- 13 universal injunction.
- 14 So how would I go about crafting some
- 15 sort of holding or to create a language that
- 16 would take care of you and the fact that you
- 17 need maybe broader complete relief than maybe an
- individual plaintiff would, right? Because the
- 19 district court didn't go through that analysis,
- 20 you know, the kind of -- the analysis that
- 21 you're telling us today.
- 22 So tell me practically what that would
- 23 look like.
- MR. FEIGENBAUM: So I think the
- 25 district court in -- in the Massachusetts case

- 1 did actually do a very good job of this. It
- 2 specifically said New -- I'm saying "New Jersey"
- 3 as a stand-in --
- 4 JUSTICE BARRETT: Yeah, yeah.
- 5 MR. FEIGENBAUM: -- 23 attorneys
- 6 general -- the states need this relief. And --
- 7 and he didn't grant universal relief to the
- 8 individual plaintiffs in that case, so he
- 9 did --- he did actually talk different --
- 10 JUSTICE BARRETT: Make a distinction.
- 11 MR. FEIGENBAUM: -- relief for
- 12 different parties, and he said this is necessary
- 13 for us.
- 14 Part of why we're talking about
- 15 alternatives in a different way at the podium
- 16 today is because these alternatives were not
- 17 presented to the district court.
- 18 So the district court just had before
- 19 him the idea that maybe we have to eat some
- 20 harms or maybe we get universal relief. And, of
- 21 course, we need universal relief given the
- 22 strength of the merits showing as between those
- 23 choices.
- I think what you could say is, here,
- 25 there were two sentences in an emergency

- 1 application that raise new alternative ways to
- 2 remedy the harms. Those sorts of things need to
- 3 be raised to the district court. And when they
- 4 are raised to district courts in appropriate
- 5 cases when states file suit, courts should ask
- 6 first are those alternatives going to be
- 7 practically or legally workable for the
- 8 plaintiffs and for third parties? I agree, to
- 9 Justice Gorsuch's point, if the federal
- 10 government wants to take on its own burdens, it
- can do so, but it can't just say that for third
- 12 parties --
- JUSTICE BARRETT: But you're talking
- 14 about what would happen in the future. I'm
- 15 talking about what would happen to you now.
- MR. FEIGENBAUM: Oh, so I think, if
- 17 the United States seriously wanted to press
- 18 these alternative with facts about how they
- 19 would work and put that before the district
- 20 court, parties can always put new alternatives
- 21 in a motion to dissolve an injunction before the
- 22 district court. That's something that has
- 23 happened regularly when there's changed
- 24 circumstances or new alternatives. They're
- 25 welcome to do that in -- in this case or in any

- other. But then they're going to have to put
- 2 forward actual facts about how it's practically
- 3 or legally workable.
- I will say, on its face, these two
- 5 sentences don't look practically or legally
- 6 workable for the reasons I raised. But they'd
- 7 have to make that showing in the district court
- 8 in the first instance.
- 9 JUSTICE BARRETT: Thank you.
- 10 CHIEF JUSTICE ROBERTS: Justice
- 11 Jackson?
- 12 JUSTICE JACKSON: So I quess I'm kind
- of hung up on the posture in which we find
- ourselves looking at these issues. You know,
- Justice Alito, I think, focused on this a little
- 16 bit, you know, when he says that the district
- 17 court makes this initial determination. It
- 18 turns out to be wrong. The remedy, I thought,
- 19 was to appeal.
- 20 And I guess, for me, the question is
- 21 whether and under what circumstances the
- 22 government keeps on doing the thing that the
- court has found unlawful while the litigation is
- 24 proceeding to determine whether or not the
- 25 government's activity violates the law.

1 We're sort of in an interim posture. 2 I -- many of your arguments, and I appreciate 3 them, are kind of couched in, you know, the state is going to need complete relief for their 4 injury, and that -- and that's true definitely 5 as a final matter. But here we are at the 6 7 beginning of this litigation, no one has determined whether or not the government's 8 9 conduct is actually unlawful. We have a 10 district court, several district courts and now 11 courts of appeals that say it is, and so, as an 12 interim matter, we are saying the government has to stop doing it while we litigate the issue of 13 14 the unlawfulness. 15 To me, that kind of puts the whole 16 thing in a different frame. It's sort of like 17 why isn't the question in this posture, in this 18 circumstance, can the government or has the 19 government shown that it is going to suffer some 20 sort of harm from being made to completely stop this activity while we're litigating the 21 2.2 lawfulness of the conduct. 23 I don't understand -- and then you 24 say, yes, we're going to suffer harm. the balance of the equities that -- you know, 25

- 1 part of the -- the -- the PI and the stay
- 2 showing, but I just don't understand why that's
- 3 not the focus here. And I don't know what
- 4 the -- and I -- I apologize because I didn't get
- 5 a chance to ask Mr. Sauer this, but -- and maybe
- 6 he can address this on his rebuttal -- but, you
- 7 know, what -- what problem is the government
- 8 facing as a harm matter from being completely
- 9 told it has to stop doing this while we
- 10 determine, we, the court system, determine
- 11 whether or not its conduct is lawful?
- 12 MR. FEIGENBAUM: So we -- I mean, we
- included this in our application. We do think
- 14 this case is quite unique in that I do think
- it's hard for the government to show in this
- 16 particular case that it needs to be able to act
- 17 contrary to this Court's settled precedent.
- 18 That's obviously come up in a couple of
- 19 questions today. It's something of I realize
- 20 the elephant in the room. I've often been asked
- 21 to assume that the merits are put to the side,
- and I'm fine assuming that for those questions.
- But, to your point, you're not wrong.
- It is guite striking, obviously, that it's not
- 25 just that district courts are saying this looks

- 1 like it might be unlawful. They're saying Wong
- 2 Kim Ark settled this exact issue 127 years ago.
- 3 This Court has reaffirmed it since. Over a
- 4 century of executive practice has built on that.
- 5 And Congress has codified that directly into
- 6 law.
- 7 So I do think it's a particularly
- 8 unusual case for the government to be saying
- 9 that it has been quite so harmed and needs this
- 10 kind of relief. But, at the end of the day, I'm
- 11 happy to join issue on when relief may or may
- 12 not be appropriate, and I just think we're
- 13 clearly on the positive side.
- JUSTICE JACKSON: But you're saying
- that at least in some circumstances from your
- 16 perspective, in order to even decide whether or
- 17 not you are entitled to an interim complete
- injunction, the Court's now going to have to
- 19 peek at the merits while the merits are being
- 20 litigated?
- 21 MR. FEIGENBAUM: I think the Court
- 22 always has to peek at the merits in deciding
- 23 whether the party itself should be getting
- relief from its harms, including complete
- relief, as even the United States accepts. So

1	those are all four of the Winter factors. You
2	have to figure out what the irreparable harm is
3	that you're trying to deal with. You have to
4	figure out if we have a sufficient merits
5	showing in order to eliminate that irreparable
6	harm, and, depending on the strength of the
7	merits showing, you're also looking at Winters
8	Factors 3 and 4.
9	So this Court has given four Winter
10	factors that I think are quite useful in most
11	cases. I took my friends on the other side to
12	be saying, well, beyond the Winter factors,
13	there's this bright-line rule from Article III
14	or the history of equity that just says it can
15	never get to this point.
16	I obviously disagree a bit with them
17	on the reading of that history, but I just think
18	it has no bearing on the case that the states
19	bring to this Court here.
20	JUSTICE JACKSON: Thank you.
21	CHIEF JUSTICE ROBERTS: Thank you,
22	counsel.
23	Ms. Corkran.
24	

1	ORAL ARGUMENT OF KELSI B. CORKRAN
2	ON BEHALF OF THE PRIVATE RESPONDENTS
3	MS. CORKRAN: Mr. Chief Justice, and
4	may it please the Court:
5	The executive order's stripping of
6	citizenship from U.Sborn children is contrary
7	not only to the Fourteenth Amendment's plain
8	text but also our common law history, this
9	Court's precedent, a federal statute, and over a
LO	century of executive branch practice.
L1	Every court to have considered the
L2	issue agrees that the order is blatantly
L3	unlawful, a determination the stay application
L4	does not challenge.
L5	The government instead argues that
L6	Article III and equitable tradition
L7	categorically prohibit providing nonparty relief
L8	from the order's enforcement regardless of the
L9	order's illegality or the irreparable harm it
20	inflicts.
21	The government is wrong. It is well
22	settled that preliminary injunctions may benefit
23	nonparties when necessary to provide complete
24	relief to the plaintiffs or when warranted by
25	extraordinary direumstances both of which are

- 1 true here.
- 2 The Court should reject the
- 3 government's efforts to stay a preliminary
- 4 injunction that maintains a status quo all three
- 5 branches of government have ratified and
- 6 operated under for over a century and that
- 7 prevent the catastrophic consequences that will
- 8 result for the plaintiffs and our country if the
- 9 government is allowed to execute an
- 10 unconstitutional citizenship-stripping scheme
- 11 simply because legal challenges take time.
- 12 I welcome the Court's questions.
- 13 JUSTICE THOMAS: You say the
- 14 government is wrong about the availability of
- 15 preliminary injunctions. On what do you base
- 16 that?
- 17 MS. CORKRAN: So I -- I think the two
- 18 reasons I identified, one, it is well settled,
- 19 and I understood General Sauer to agree today,
- 20 that universal injunctive relief is appropriate
- 21 when necessary to provide complete relief to the
- 22 plaintiffs. That is the case here, and I'm
- 23 happy to talk about that.
- 24 But I also -- you know, this Court has
- long recognized the availability of universal

- 1 injunctive relief in extraordinary circumstances
- where it's -- it's -- it's justified, I
- 3 think focused particularly on the public
- 4 interest and -- and equities prongs of the
- 5 Winter test. And I'm happy to talk about that
- 6 as well, but I think those are the -- the two
- 7 reasons the government --
- 8 JUSTICE THOMAS: Do you think that
- 9 if -- even if one considers the history not to
- 10 support you, that the pragmatic considerations
- and the policy considerations should override
- 12 that?
- MS. CORKRAN: So I -- you know, again,
- I would put us in the complete relief bucket.
- 15 So I'll -- like Mr. Feigenbaum, I'll put on my
- 16 amici hat in answering that question.
- 17 I understand General Sauer's proposal
- to be that we channel all of this through Rule
- 19 23. I think that is ahistorical. One, it's
- 20 consistent with the Rules Committee's
- 21 understanding of the rules, both -- if you look
- 22 at Rule 23, Rule 65, and Rule 71 together, they
- 23 establish that Rule 23 is not the channeling
- 24 mechanism that the government's suggesting.
- 25 I want to -- I'll start with Rule 71

- 1 because it's responsive, Justice Barrett, to
- 2 your question earlier about whether nonparties
- 3 can enforce orders. Rule 71 explicitly
- 4 contemplates that and says, if a nonparty
- 5 receives relief, they are entitled to enforce
- 6 it.
- 7 I'd point also to Rule 65, the
- 8 preliminary injunction rule. In 2017, the Rules
- 9 Committee considered a proposal from Professor
- 10 Bray to amend the rule to prohibit relief to
- 11 nonparties. The committee rejected that
- 12 proposal because it found that it ran afoul of
- 13 the Rules-Enabling Committee.
- 14 And then I'd end by pointing to Rule
- 15 23 itself, which says nothing about it being a
- 16 channeling mechanism. In Principi v.
- 17 Scarborough, this Court said, you know, we don't
- 18 treat the rules as excluding background
- 19 equitable practices. And, here, Rule 23 doesn't
- 20 even contemplate preliminary relief. It's
- 21 focused on permanent injunctive relief, and I
- think that's because, you know, as we've been
- discussing, it's very difficult to get class
- 24 certification in time to have preliminary
- relief, so you're doing putative class relief,

- 1 which is the exact same thing as what's
- 2 happening here.
- JUSTICE KAVANAUGH: Well, can't --
- 4 CHIEF JUSTICE ROBERTS: Is --
- 5 JUSTICE KAVANAUGH: -- why can't you
- 6 get putative class relief in a preliminary
- 7 injunction or TRO posture?
- 8 MS. CORKRAN: You mean -- sorry. In
- 9 the multiple state context?
- 10 JUSTICE KAVANAUGH: Get relief in a --
- 11 for a putative class --
- MS. CORKRAN: Yeah.
- JUSTICE KAVANAUGH: -- in a TRO or PI
- 14 posture.
- MS. CORKRAN: Oh, I -- I certainly --
- 16 I certainly think you can. The Court did that
- 17 recently in AARP.
- 18 My point is, when the Court does that,
- 19 it's relying on the equitable authority it has
- 20 to enter that sort of relief, not on the Rule 23
- 21 mechanism, because the class isn't binding until
- 22 after certification, until after final judgment.
- 23 JUSTICE KAVANAUGH: If that mechanism
- is available, whether one way or another,
- doesn't that solve a large part of the problem

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1
      in a way that complies with the -- the rules --
 2
               MS. CORKRAN: Yeah.
                                     So --
                JUSTICE KAVANAUGH: -- the problems
 3
      with universal injunctions that have been
 4
      identified by administrations of both parties?
 5
 6
               Go through Rule 23 and do what's
 7
     needed there, and people are bound then, so
      that's a wrinkle, but why doesn't that just
8
 9
      solve the problem?
10
               MS. CORKRAN: Right. So they're not
11
     going to be bound until after you get past class
12
      certification, so we're talking about the --
                JUSTICE KAVANAUGH: I understand that.
13
14
               MS. CORKRAN: And for that reason, I
     would go to Justice Alito's point earlier that
15
16
      all you're doing is taking the -- the non-party
17
      injunctions that are happening now outside of
18
     Rule 23 and shoving them into Rule 23. It
19
      doesn't address the forum selection concerns.
20
      It doesn't address the concerns about the --
21
                JUSTICE KAVANAUGH: Right, but it --
2.2
                MS. CORKRAN: -- emergency docket.
23
                JUSTICE KAVANAUGH: -- it complies
                       I mean, the law -- we -- we
24
     with the rules.
      care about technicalities. And this may all be
25
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- 1 a technicality, but it seems to me the
- 2 technicality of Rule 23 and the history of that
- 3 provides -- 23(b)(2) provides a mechanism to do
- 4 what's -- what's needed here in terms of getting
- 5 relief to people, and if you have PIs available
- 6 for putative classes, that seems to solve --
- 7 solve the issue for preliminary relief and the
- 8 timing issue as well.
- 9 MS. CORKRAN: So (b)(2) provides for
- 10 permanent injunctive relief. It does not
- 11 provide for preliminary injunctive relief.
- 12 JUSTICE KAVANAUGH: Right.
- MS. CORKRAN: Again, Rule 23 does not
- 14 purport to be the exclusive channeling
- 15 mechanism. And, as I said, the Rules Committee
- doesn't think it did, so it would be this Court
- 17 kind of projecting its own policy decision to
- 18 treat Rule 23 that way.
- 19 And I would come back again to Justice
- 20 Alito's concerns. That is not actually
- 21 addressing the Court's emergency docket. It's
- just now we're slapping a label of class
- 23 certification on it.
- So I would -- and -- and I'll make a
- 25 second point on that and then say what I think

- 1 the better -- the better way of approaching the
- 2 problem is, which is I think that General Sauer
- 3 and I are in agreement that the Venn diagram of
- 4 cases that are appropriate for class
- 5 certification and where injunctive relief I
- 6 think would be appropriate is not coterminous.
- 7 I think we could pursue successfully class
- 8 certification here.
- 9 I heard General Sauer to disagree, and
- 10 I think it's because they're -- they're just
- 11 different circumstances. If you look at the
- 12 class certification requirements, commonality,
- typicality, they were actually added to Rule 23
- in 1966 mostly to address the expansion of class
- 15 certification to include damages suits. That
- 16 makes sense there, but those were never
- 17 requirements prior to 1966.
- JUSTICE GORSUCH: Ms. Corkran, on --
- on the class certification point you've been
- 20 developing, one response might be -- and I just
- 21 want to get your reaction to it -- that by
- 22 proceeding through the class mechanism, even a
- 23 putative class mechanism, a court is making a
- 24 preliminary assessment about who are the parties
- 25 going to be before it and issuing interim relief

- 1 so that it preserves its jurisdiction to issue
- 2 final relief with respect to those parties.
- 3 And that's very different, the
- 4 argument would go, than simply saying everybody
- 5 everywhere nationwide, universally or perhap --
- 6 perhaps cosmically stands to benefit from this
- 7 decision without ever having to suffer being
- 8 bound by it. Thoughts?
- 9 MS. CORKRAN: So I would say again
- 10 that's an ahistorical approach. You haven't had
- 11 that sort of Rule 20(b)(3) --
- 12 JUSTICE GORSUCH: Well, assume --
- 13 assume for the moment that we read bills of
- 14 peace, which I understand to be your -- your --
- 15 your best set of cases, to be prototypical of
- 16 what is now Rule 23.
- 17 MS. CORKRAN: Right. And so the --
- the bills of peace and kind of going through, as
- 19 Mr. Feigenbaum was talking about, Equity Rule 48
- and then 38, in none of those circumstances were
- 21 we doing this ex ante class certification
- 22 determination.
- 23 So the modern class action device
- 24 actually looks quite different than it was for
- 25 representative suits historically. So it would

1 be putting on an ahistorical constraint. 2 JUSTICE GORSUCH: I appreciate that 3 argument, okay, but now we're haggling over the history, which -- which we have to do, I -- I 4 accept, but if -- if -- if bills of peace are 5 understood -- again, accept the premise --6 7 MS. CORKRAN: I will. JUSTICE GORSUCH: -- to -- to be 8 9 predecessors of Rule 23, then respond to the 10 point that there is something fundamentally 11 different about a preliminary injunction to a 12 putative class that you've found is likely to be certified and likely to succeed on the merits in 13 14 order to preserve that court's jurisdiction to 15 award ultimate relief to those parties before it 16 and that that's categorically different than a 17 universal injunction. 18 MS. CORKRAN: So starting with the 19 presumption that was different about the bills 20 of peace is that they were binding, I think 21 sometimes it's not clear always, at the end when 2.2 they were getting to final judgment. I would go 23 back to Grupo Mexicano to Justice Barrett's 24 point, although that -- you know, that was a

high watermark of this equitable originalism.

- 1 The way the Court articulated the test, it -- it
- 2 focused on 1789. But the actual analysis in
- 3 Grup Mexicano focused on 1890 through 1942.
- 4 And what the Court found there is that
- 5 there were numerous cases expressly rejecting
- 6 the Mareva injunction, and that was confirmed in
- 7 the 1970s when England adopted it and said, no,
- 8 we've never done this before.
- 9 We are in an entirely different world
- 10 here. One, the cases that Justice Sotomayor
- 11 laid out earlier all come from between 1890 and
- 12 1942, and they suggest that non-party relief was
- 13 provided for outside of the class action
- 14 context.
- But the fact that we have, I think,
- these very, you know, studied scholars in this
- 17 rigorous debate about what the bills of peace
- 18 meant, what the railroad cases meant, I think
- 19 shows that this is very different in Grupo
- 20 Mexicano, and for the Court to kind of delve
- 21 into that and adopt the categorical rule that
- 22 the government is suggesting, I think, is
- 23 certainly an overcorrection. It's a hornet's
- 24 nest on Article III, right? It calls into
- 25 concern EPA class action, a whole sort of

- 1 things. I would suggest that the Court instead
- 2 focus on providing limiting principles within
- 3 the confines of the Nken factors or the Winter
- 4 factors.
- 5 JUSTICE KAVANAUGH: And is there a
- 6 practical problem? So I want to put aside the
- 7 history, and I take your points on that and why
- 8 you don't think Rule 23 fits, and I take your
- 9 point on that, but if putative class actions and
- 10 preliminary relief are an option, what then is
- 11 the practical problem you see as distinct from
- 12 the current regime?
- MS. CORKRAN: Well, if General Sauer
- is right and that there are class certification
- problems here, then, in this particular case,
- 16 you're going to have thousands of individual
- 17 suits.
- JUSTICE KAVANAUGH: Okay. I think you
- 19 would be arguing that the class should be
- 20 certified here.
- MS. CORKRAN: Right, but I'm saying
- 22 the government is suggesting --
- JUSTICE KAVANAUGH: So more -- more
- 24 generally taking it out of this case if you
- 25 could, do you see practical problems?

1 MS. CORKRAN: Yeah. It would 2 eliminate the associational standing trade 3 cases, you know, the cases brought by the 4 Chamber of Commerce, the NRA, other associations that are suitable for class certification. 5 6 I think also the questions again that 7 the --8 JUSTICE KAVANAUGH: Why? Can you 9 explain that? MS. CORKRAN: Well, they wouldn't --10 11 so if we -- if we were to seek cert, it would be 12 on behalf of our individual --13 JUSTICE KAVANAUGH: Mm-hmm. 14 MS. CORKRAN: -- plaintiffs, you know, 15 for the same reason that the government would 16 have difficulty seeking class certification, the 17 state government I think associations are -- are 18 not necessarily a good fit for that -- for that 19 framework. 20 Again, that's also not solving the 21 Court's problem. It's just channeling the 22 problems through a different mechanism. 23 JUSTICE KAVANAUGH: I don't think that 24 can be solved just to be honest, but that's a 25 separate issue --

1	MS. CORKRAN: Well
2	JUSTICE KAVANAUGH: from what the
3	right rule is as to how things transpire in the
4	district courts.
5	MS. CORKRAN: Could I perhaps try to
6	solve it in a different way?
7	JUSTICE KAVANAUGH: Mm-hmm.
8	MS. CORKRAN: What I would suggest,
9	you know, we spent some time trying to catalog
LO	the cases in which this Court has approved
L1	universal injunctive relief and the cases in
L2	which it's rejected it, with the aim of giving
L3	the Court maybe a suggestion how it might, you
L4	know, affirmatively articulate some limiting
L5	principles such that you would not be getting
L6	the injunctions that the Court thinks are
L7	inappropriate but the ones that the Court has
L8	approved would still be able to proceed. Again
L9	that's not the categorical rule that the the
20	government is suggesting.
21	I think roughly what the Court has
22	been doing is saying that universal injunctions
23	are appropriate only in facial challenges
24	involving fundamental constitutional rights
5	where there are real concerns about whether

- 1 just the legal and practical availability of
- 2 relief to similarly situated parties who are
- 3 also going to experience irreparable harm.
- 4 I think that maybe explains AARP.
- 5 Most recently, IRAP would fall into that
- 6 category. Chrysafis, the New York eviction
- 7 case, would fall in that category.
- 8 On the other side of the ledger, the
- 9 Court seems to disapprove quite a bit of -- of
- 10 nationwide injunctions involving discretionary
- 11 benefits. So that's some of the recent ones
- 12 that you have undone or stayed.
- So I think what the Court could do is
- 14 kind of identifying limiting principles that
- would provide guidance to the lower courts on
- when it's appropriate to issue these
- 17 injunctions. The natural home for that is the
- 18 public interest prong of the Winter test, right?
- 19 If you're going to issue an injunction
- that's going to have an impact on other peoples,
- 21 you need to be doing a really muscular public
- interest assessment before doing that.
- 23 So that's -- that's what I would urge
- 24 the Court --
- 25 JUSTICE KAVANAUGH: I mean --

1	JUSTICE KAGAN: Ms. Corkran, are
2	are you pushing back on the class certification
3	idea because you're worried that there are cases
4	where there will be no certification but in
5	which broad relief is, in fact, appropriate
6	MS. CORKRAN: Yes.
7	JUSTICE KAGAN: so that the two
8	categories don't line up?
9	And if that's why you're pushing back,
10	why are you worried about that? What are the
11	cases you're worried won't line up properly in
12	that way?
13	MS. CORKRAN: I mean, the government
14	has suggested it's going to argue that here
15	again, I think the commonality so thinking
16	about questions like common injury make a lot of
17	sense when you're talking about class-wide
18	damages, less so when you're talking about a
19	facial challenge to a constitutional violation.
20	So I just I think it's a bit of a
21	mismatch. And, again, it's not it's not what
22	Rule 23 was ever intended to do and it doesn't
23	solve any of the Court's policy problems. So I
24	think it's a you know, it's a lose-lose-lose
25	proposal that the government is offering.

1 I'm -- I'm a little concerned that I 2 have focused a lot on my amici hat and haven't 3 actually explained to the Court why the injunction is necessary for complete relief 4 here, but I don't want to pivot too quickly, but 5 I want to make sure I address our -- our primary 6 7 argument as well. JUSTICE KAGAN: Tell us why it's 8 necessary for complete relief. 9 10 MS. CORKRAN: Yes. 11 (Laughter.) 12 MS. CORKRAN: Thank you. For two 13 reasons. The first is that a plaintiff-specific 14 injunction would not be administratively 15 workable. I'll explain that in a second. 16 But I want to note the second one is 17 that even if it were workable, it would require 18 the association members to identify and disclose 19 to the government an association that puts them 20 at great risk of adverse consequences, detention 21 or deportation, even if they're here lawfully. 2.2 And so it's not complete relief to require the 23 plaintiffs to make dangerous disclosures in order to claim the constitutional right. 24 25 And then maybe I'll pivot back to the

- 1 workability unless there are questions about
- 2 that. Yeah. So I'll -- oh, sorry.
- 3 CHIEF JUSTICE ROBERTS: Very briefly,
- 4 and then we'll move on to the next stage of our
- 5 questioning.
- 6 MS. CORKRAN: So the government's
- 7 workability argument with respect to the -- the
- 8 individual plaintiffs, the private plaintiffs,
- 9 is wholly tethered to its argument that the
- injunction should be limited to the 16 named
- 11 plaintiffs. It has offered no argument for how
- 12 it would administer -- how state and local
- agencies could administer an injunction that was
- 14 narrowed to the ASAP and CASA members. So I
- think that's probably the end of the road.
- 16 Mr. Feigenbaum made the point that the
- 17 district -- they can always go back to the
- 18 district court and ask for the injunction to be
- dissolved if they present some sort of workable
- 20 proposal. They haven't, and I don't -- I don't
- 21 think they can. I don't want to talk for too
- 22 long, but I -- if anyone is interested, I'm
- 23 happy to answer questions about why I think it's
- 24 unworkable.
- 25 CHIEF JUSTICE ROBERTS: Well, I'm sure

- 1 someone will be.
- 2 MS. CORKRAN: Yeah.
- 3 CHIEF JUSTICE ROBERTS: Thank -- thank
- 4 you, though, counsel.
- 5 Justice Thomas?
- 6 Justice Alito?
- 7 JUSTICE ALITO: Should we decide or
- 8 make up our -- make up our minds on the
- 9 underlying birthright citizenship question
- 10 without briefing and argument and deliberation?
- 11 MS. CORKRAN: I -- I think that we
- would be very eager to do supplemental briefing
- on that. General Sauer noted that none of the
- 14 parties had asked for cert before judgment. We
- 15 couldn't because we keep winning. I will ask
- 16 right now for cert before judgment.
- 17 (Laughter.)
- JUSTICE ALITO: What was the -- what's
- 19 the answer to my -- what's the answer to my
- 20 question?
- 21 MS. CORKRAN: Yes, I think you can
- 22 grant cert before judgment. I also think --
- JUSTICE ALITO: No, that wasn't my
- 24 question.
- MS. CORKRAN: Yeah. But I will say I

- 1 think --
- JUSTICE ALITO: All right. That's all
- 3 right.
- 4 MS. CORKRAN: Yeah. No --
- 5 JUSTICE ALITO: That's all right. You
- 6 don't want to answer it. That's all right.
- 7 MS. CORKRAN: Oh, no, no, I will. I
- 8 have an -- if I could give an answer, which is
- 9 that I think it's very difficult if -- or not
- impossible for the Court to do a meaningful Nken
- 11 analysis without taking into account the fact
- that the government is asking the Court to allow
- it to ignore this Court's precedent, to ignore a
- duly enacted statute, and to upend a hundred
- 15 years of executive branch practice.
- So I think, you know, although the
- 17 Court -- the government has attempted to
- 18 separate them, that, really, the merits are
- 19 embedded in the Nken factors.
- 20 CHIEF JUSTICE ROBERTS: Justice
- 21 Sotomayor?
- JUSTICE SOTOMAYOR: I find it hard to
- 23 understand how a district court, in looking at a
- 24 preliminary injunction under the Winter factors,
- 25 where we said that the likelihood of success on

- 1 the merits is the keystone, how we could
- 2 separate that out and say the keystone of
- 3 whether you're entitled to universal injunction
- 4 is the only merits question because the other
- 5 factors are not eliminated by Winter. You have
- 6 to balance the equities, and you can't balance
- 7 the equities without the merits, correct?
- 8 MS. CORKRAN: I think that's right. I
- 9 think also I don't -- you know, irreparable harm
- is going to be very difficult for the government
- 11 to prove if it's not contesting that the -- or
- 12 not contesting -- or at least not defending the
- 13 constitutionality of the order because the
- 14 government has no interest in enforcing an
- 15 unconstitutional order.
- 16 I'd also note there's a -- there's a
- 17 quote from Professor Bray in Justice Gorsuch's
- 18 Texas concurrence, and it's: "In equity, it all
- 19 connects. The broader and deeper the relief the
- 20 plaintiff seeks, the stronger the plaintiff's
- 21 story has to be." So I think there really is
- 22 kind of an equitable consideration here of the
- 23 merits as well that just can't be extracted from
- 24 the --
- 25 JUSTICE SOTOMAYOR: Now the state has

- 1 explained why it can't pursue class actions. So
- 2 it really -- it admits it's limited to whether
- 3 it's entitled to complete relief.
- 4 But how about your organization?
- 5 You --
- 6 MS. CORKRAN: I -- I --
- 7 JUSTICE SOTOMAYOR: -- you sort of
- 8 answered it, but I wanted to pin you down on
- 9 that.
- 10 MS. CORKRAN: No, I --
- 11 JUSTICE SOTOMAYOR: Do you believe
- 12 that associational organizations can seek class
- 13 action?
- MS. CORKRAN: I believe our individual
- 15 plaintiffs certainly can. I am --
- JUSTICE SOTOMAYOR: Yes, there's no
- 17 question there.
- MS. CORKRAN: Yeah. I am -- I am
- 19 nervous about the government's suggestion that
- 20 it's going to oppose our class certification
- 21 motion if we were to file one. I think class
- 22 certification can be -- can be very
- 23 discovery-intensive. It could be the sort of
- 24 thing that really delays the -- our plaintiffs
- 25 from getting the relief that they seek.

1	JUSTICE SOTOMAYOR: Okay. Thank you.
2	CHIEF JUSTICE ROBERTS: Justice Kagan?
3	JUSTICE KAGAN: I guess what I worry
4	about here, Ms. Corkran, is that this case is
5	very different from a lot of our nationwide
6	injunction cases in which many of us have
7	expressed frustration at the way district courts
8	are doing their business.
9	And, you know, our our the
LO	typical way in which that frustration emerges is
L1	that questions, legal questions, are hard, and
L2	they're come complicated, and different courts
L3	would decide them differently. And, instead,
L4	because of the forum selection process, a party
L5	goes to one place. You know, in the first Trump
L6	administration, it was all done in
L7	San Francisco, and then, in the next
L8	administration, it was all done in Texas.
L9	MS. CORKRAN: Right.
20	JUSTICE KAGAN: And and and
21	there is a big problem that is created by that
22	mechanism, and that leads to the questions to
23	you and to General Feigenbaum, which is, like,
24	you know, your third buckets, which are, oh, if
25	it's, like, super-important or if it's

- 1 quintessentially national or whatever the way --
- 2 you know, is not going to solve our problem for
- 3 that set of cases, which is not this case.
- 4 This case, what's problematic about it
- 5 is that the courts keep deciding the same way,
- 6 and nobody really thinks that the lower courts
- 7 are going to do anything different.
- 8 MS. CORKRAN: Right.
- 9 JUSTICE KAGAN: And it -- you know,
- 10 for that reason, it does present the "catch me
- if you can problem that Justice Jackson said
- and the problem of how are we ever going to get
- 13 a case here.
- 14 But -- but our general case is not
- 15 like that, and I just want you to sort of
- 16 comment on it.
- 17 MS. CORKRAN: Yeah. I'd say first
- that the government's proposal of channeling
- 19 through Rule 23 does nothing to solve anything
- 20 you just described.
- I think the limiting principles that I
- was proposing, which, again, was just me trying
- 23 to reflect back to the Court kind of the through
- lines that it's been identifying, are
- 25 sufficiently concrete that if this Court were to

- 1 articulate them, it would cut back on the number
- 2 of universal injunctions. Is it a facial
- 3 challenge? Does it involve a fundamental
- 4 constitutional right? Right? Those are --
- 5 those are concrete questions.
- And then I would point to, you know,
- 7 Justice Kavanaugh's Poe concurrence. I think,
- 8 you know, vertical stare decisis is going to be
- 9 important here. When courts enter these sorts
- 10 of district -- these sorts of injunctions, they
- 11 are immediately appealable to the courts of
- 12 appeal. So, if there are any district courts
- that are kind of getting over their skis on
- these, it's correctable by the courts of
- 15 appeals.
- 16 CHIEF JUSTICE ROBERTS: Justice
- 17 Gorsuch?
- 18 Justice Kavanaugh?
- 19 JUSTICE KAVANAUGH: Some of your
- 20 concerns about this Court being involved, I
- 21 guess I'm not sure I really understand that.
- 22 When the -- when a president or an
- 23 administration enacts some major new rule, the
- 24 question ultimately -- and it's legally
- 25 challenged -- ultimately will be a year or two

- from now, it'll get here and we'll make a final
- judgment, but the interim status of that rule,
- 3 as this case illustrates and many others --
- 4 vaccine mandate, eviction moratorium, go down
- 5 the list -- they're really important whether
- 6 they're in effect for that year or two.
- 7 And I guess I don't know why we -- we
- 8 -- you should be concerned or we should be
- 9 concerned about this Court playing a role in
- 10 those.
- 11 MS. CORKRAN: Oh, I don't have
- 12 concerns about that. I was responding to
- General Sauer's point that this has become
- 14 pathological in the number of universal
- 15 injunctions that are making its way onto the
- 16 Court's emergency docket, but my --
- 17 JUSTICE KAVANAUGH: Just because there
- 18 are more significant executive actions over the
- 19 last three decades --
- 20 MS. CORKRAN: Yeah. I certainly agree
- 21 with that. And I -- you know, I --
- JUSTICE KAVANAUGH: -- that are --
- 23 that are, you know, at the -- Loper Bright and
- 24 our West Virginia versus EPA are arguably some
- 25 part of that story as well.

1 MS. CORKRAN: I agree completely. 2 to answer the question you asked General Sauer 3 earlier about why we've seen this proliferation of these universal injunctions, I think it's 4 directly -- I would say first that the 5 government, I think, pretty dramatically 6 7 overstates them. It's double-counting TROs and PIs in the same case. 8 9 But, if you look at the number of executive actions in the first six weeks of this 10 11 administration, it's more than any other 12 president issued in a year dating back to 1951 13 during the Korean War. 14 JUSTICE KAVANAUGH: But I don't want to -- I mean, it's --15 16 MS. CORKRAN: Yeah. 17 JUSTICE KAVANAUGH: You know, it's going back. It's a bipartisan phenomenon --18 19 MS. CORKRAN: Agree. 20 JUSTICE KAVANAUGH: -- completely 21 bipartisan, and completely, in my view, well 22 intentioned because presidents want to get 23 things done. 24 MS. CORKRAN: Right. 25 JUSTICE KAVANAUGH: And I -- I get

- 1 that.
- 2 MS. CORKRAN: Yeah. I -- I agree with
- 3 that. I think it's -- it's directly correlated
- 4 to the number of unilateral executive actions
- 5 we've seen over the last few years --
- 6 administrations.
- 7 CHIEF JUSTICE ROBERTS: Justice
- 8 Barrett?
- 9 JUSTICE BARRETT: Ms. Corkran, I just
- 10 have one question. You said that you're in
- 11 bucket one.
- MS. CORKRAN: Yes.
- JUSTICE BARRETT: So you felt like you
- 14 were --
- MS. CORKRAN: Oh, yeah.
- 16 JUSTICE BARRETT: -- playing kind of
- 17 the amici role. I understand why you might
- think you're in bucket one for the associational
- 19 point. Do you think you're in bucket one for
- 20 individual plaintiffs?
- MS. CORKRAN: So I don't know that I
- 22 would extract them because the universal --
- JUSTICE BARRETT: What named
- 24 plaintiff? Like, let's imagine you had
- individual plaintiffs that are named members of

- 1 the association. So let's -- I guess what I'm
- 2 saying is let's take the association outside of
- 3 it and let's just say that we're talking about
- 4 individual plaintiffs.
- 5 MS. CORKRAN: So, there, I --
- 6 JUSTICE BARRETT: Would you put that
- 7 in bucket one?
- 8 MS. CORKRAN: So, there, I would go to
- 9 the second injury I -- I had identified earlier,
- 10 which is if you're asking -- our -- our
- individual plaintiffs have pseudo names right
- 12 now. That would be contemplating a scenario
- where they would have to identify themselves to
- 14 the federal government and say I am an ace -- or
- 15 I am the plaintiff in this case. At which point
- they are immediately vulnerable to deportation,
- even, again, if they are here lawfully.
- We've seen the government removing
- 19 visa holders and -- and asylum seekers.
- 20 CHIEF JUSTICE ROBERTS: Justice
- 21 Jackson?
- JUSTICE JACKSON: So I think I
- 23 understand your arguments. There is just one
- little piece of it that is confusing to me, and
- 25 I hope you can clarify.

1 So if we view the relief in this case, 2 and others like it, to be a judgment ordering 3 the defendant not to do something that the court has found to be likely -- because we're in the 4 interim stage -- unlawful, are nonparties in 5 that situation actually getting relief or are 6 7 they just incidental beneficiaries of an order requiring the government not to do this harmful 8 9 thing? 10 I thought it was the latter. 11 MS. CORKRAN: Yeah. 12 JUSTICE JACKSON: And that just -- you 13 know, the government is told by the Court: 14 Don't do X. And, of course, anybody who would 15 have been harmed by the government doing X is 16 benefitted by that, but they're not really, I 17 thought, getting relief. 18 But here -- here's where I get 19 confused, because I thought they're not getting 20 relief because they can't come into court 21 independently and seek a contempt ruling if the 2.2 government continues to do the thing. 23 They weren't parties. They don't have That's what differentiates them 24 the judgment. 25 from, say, the class action people or the

- 1 plaintiff people.
- 2 The reason why we have the rules for
- 3 class action, et cetera, is because, at the end
- 4 of the day, the members of the class are getting
- 5 a judgment that they can then use to enforce
- 6 this obligation as against the government,
- 7 whereas the people in the universal injunction
- 8 world are just benefitting if the government
- 9 actually, you know, follows the order.
- 10 MS. CORKRAN: Yeah, I -- I think that
- 11 what you're articulating is consistent with a
- long history of precedent and practice. I mean,
- it's the classic rem case, right, making a
- 14 declaration about property. I think Professor
- 15 Pfander's amicus brief is really helpful on
- 16 that. He talks about the -- the patent laws.
- 17 And I think you can see that same
- 18 instinct in the Court's cases that Justice
- 19 Sotomayor was talking about earlier, right, the
- 20 railroad rates, Barnett, Pierce v. Society of
- 21 Sisters.
- JUSTICE JACKSON: And I guess my point
- is that's why we don't need Rule 23, because
- we're actually doing, conceptually, a different
- 25 thing.

1 We're not trying to give all these 2 people, everyone in the world, some sort of 3 enforceable right as against the government. are simply just doing what courts do, I thought, 4 which is telling the defendant over whom they 5 6 have personal jurisdiction that they have to 7 stop doing something unlawful. And, of course, 8 that benefits people. But the thing that confuses me about 9 10 your argument is that you alluded at the 11 beginning to Rule 71 and suggested that the 12 non -- the nonparties could somehow enforce this universal injunction. I didn't understand that. 13 14 MS. CORKRAN: I think Rule 71 15 contemplates that. It would be very onerous. 16 mean, I -- I think when General Sauer, he was 17 kind of contemplating the idea that, you know, tens of thousands of people were going to have 18 19 to come to court individually --20 JUSTICE JACKSON: Right. But I think 21 if you're right about that, it undermines the 2.2 point that I'm making because it puts people in 23 the same place as the class action folks and 24 the -- the parties in a way that -- that -- that 25 I think raises legitimate concerns that some of

- 1 my colleagues have put forward with respect to
- 2 universal injunction.
- 3 So the thing that distinguishes them
- 4 is that universal injunctions are not
- 5 benefitting or giving relief to nonparties in
- 6 any meaningful sense, is my theory.
- 7 MS. CORKRAN: I think both have always
- 8 been true, and maybe they're in tension with
- 9 each other. But Rule 71's originated in equity
- 10 rule X, which was enacted in -- or was put in
- 11 place in 1842, which had the same -- same idea
- of, quite apart from representative suits,
- 13 nonparties enforcing orders that provided them
- 14 with relief.
- 15 Although maybe this -- as I'm talking,
- 16 I think maybe -- I'm talking about under Rule 71
- 17 orders that --
- JUSTICE JACKSON: Let me just --
- MS. CORKRAN: -- provide relief --
- JUSTICE JACKSON: But let me just ask
- 21 you this --
- MS. CORKRAN: -- you're talking about
- 23 injunctions.
- JUSTICE JACKSON: Yes, right.
- MS. CORKRAN: Yes. Those are

- 1 different things.
- 2 JUSTICE JACKSON: What I'm asking you
- 3 is: In this very case, if we have a -- a series
- 4 of non -- of plaintiffs, of actually named
- 5 people, and they get an injunction, as the
- 6 government says, against -- sorry. If they get
- 7 a universal injunction, or what they call a
- 8 universal injunction, the -- the government
- 9 cannot enforce this executive order, can someone
- 10 who is not a nonplaintiff come into court to
- 11 enforce that if the government violates it?
- MS. CORKRAN: So -- so I'm hesitant to
- say no, both because Rule 71 exists and those
- aren't my -- my -- my clients or my plaintiffs
- 15 and we needed this universal injunction --
- 16 JUSTICE JACKSON: Yes, I understand.
- MS. CORKRAN: -- for purposes of
- 18 our --
- 19 JUSTICE JACKSON: I'm just trying to
- 20 figure this out.
- 21 MS. CORKRAN: But I think both -- you
- 22 know, I -- I think both what you said is true.
- 23 If we look at cases like Barnett and Pierce and
- 24 we go all the way back -- I would -- I think
- 25 Justice Story's dissent that he signed on to in

- 1 Cherokee Nation v. Georgia is terrific on this
- 2 point.
- 3 He was the preeminent scholar on
- 4 equitable remedies, and he certainly thought, in
- 5 the way that you're articulating, we're going to
- 6 make a declaration about whether Georgia can
- 7 enforce its laws on Cherokee Nation property,
- 8 and that is just a declaration of the law that
- 9 will have an impact on -- on everyone.
- 10 But I would -- I'm hesitant to say
- 11 that Rule 71 doesn't have any application.
- 12 JUSTICE JACKSON: Thank you.
- 13 CHIEF JUSTICE ROBERTS: Thank you,
- 14 counsel.
- 15 Rebuttal, General Sauer?
- 16 REBUTTAL ARGUMENT OF GEN. D. JOHN SAUER
- 17 ON BEHALF OF THE APPLICANTS
- 18 GENERAL SAUER: Thank you,
- 19 Mr. Chief Justice.
- The original meaning of the
- 21 Citizenship Clause extended citizenship to the
- 22 children of former slaves, not to people who are
- 23 unlawfully or temporarily present in the
- 24 United States.
- 25 The merits arguments we are presenting

- 1 to the lower courts are compelling. We cite,
- 2 for example, a host of 19th century authorities
- 3 that point out that domicile was the touchstone
- 4 of noncitizens being treated as -- having their
- 5 offspring treated as -- as citizens in that
- 6 context.
- 7 That is consistent with Wong Kim Ark
- 8 as well as with the slaughterhouse cases in Elk
- 9 against Wilkins. And the suggestion that our
- 10 position on the merits is weak is profoundly
- 11 mistaken.
- 12 And that kind of snap judgment on the
- merits that was presented in the lower courts is
- 14 exactly the problem with the issue of racing to
- issue these nationwide injunctions.
- The Chief Justice correctly pointed
- 17 out that this Court, if it wishes to address the
- merits expeditiously, has many tools to do so.
- 19 Cert before judgment is one possible tool.
- 20 There are also others.
- 21 But this Court should also address the
- scope of remedy, the remedial question that's
- 23 presented in the application. That is an
- 24 extremely urgent question.
- 25 And one of the reasons an extremely

- 1 urgent question is the limiting principles that
- 2 my friends on the other side have been offering
- 3 have all proven to be completely ineffective to
- 4 slowing the essentially slaughter -- flood or
- 5 cascade of universal injunctions that we see in
- 6 these cases.
- 7 The states here have a unique issue
- 8 that hasn't come up yet, but for the reasons we
- 9 state in our application they lack third-party
- 10 standing very clearly under cases like Murthy
- and Haaland and Katzenbach and Kowalski. So no
- injunctive relief should run to the states in
- 13 this particular case anyway.
- 14 And most fundamentally, the vision of
- 15 the district courts that's reflected in the
- 16 issuance of these nationwide injunctions is a
- 17 vision of them as a roving commission to correct
- 18 every legal wrong that they -- that they can
- 19 consider and to exercise general legal oversight
- 20 over the executive branch, which is what this
- 21 Court rejected in TransUnion.
- 22 And for those reasons, we ask the
- 23 Court to grant the applications.
- 24 CHIEF JUSTICE ROBERTS: Thank you,
- 25 counsel. The case is submitted.

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